

**NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DYNAMICS: FOREIGN
POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(Russia, China, Persian Gulf, Caucasus, Turkey, and Iran)**

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Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to review and analyze U.S. national security strategy according to its foreign policy interests over the past 25 years in order to gain a deeper understand of its implications of the South Caucasus and the Greater Middle East. First, it will outline what U.S. national interests are according to each Presidential administration from George H.W. Bush to the current Trump Presidency. Then, it will summarize how each administration conducted its national security agenda towards (1) China, (2) Russia, (3) The Greater Middle East, (4) Iran, (5) Turkey, and (6) the South Caucasus. Finally, it will conclude with policy considerations based on the Trump Administration: a shift from a neoliberal multilateral approach to an ‘America First’ one.

U.S. National Interests: Main Goals & Priorities

In the 20th century, U.S. national interests identified with keeping its population safe and free.¹ Following the two world wars and the spread of

¹ U.S. House of Representatives, Office of the Historian. “State of the Union Address.” Web. 31 July 2017. <http://history.house.gov/Institution/SOTU/State-of-the-Union/> Note: This is particularly evident from the first of 82 deliveries of the U.S. State of the Union

the Iron Curtain across Eastern Europe,² the U.S. practiced a staunch foreign policy of containment of Soviet influence. Throughout the Cold War, it actively supported nations that would oppose communism. The Western philosophy held that the Soviet Union (USSR) was a rival and could never be trusted.³ U.S. foreign policy was mainly driven by bolstering countries (even ones with right-wing dictatorships) that were perceived to be at risk of swinging toward communism. Oftentimes, it resorted to military force and nuclear proliferation, as seen from the first H-bomb test in the Marshall Islands, Explorer I in response to the Soviet R-7 Missile during the ‘Space Race,’ the Korean Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, etc.⁴ After the Cold War, President H.W. Bush praised the U.S. victory over the USSR, validating containment and military intervention.⁵ However, the U.S. had to adjust its foreign policy to deal with swift changes in the post-Soviet bloc and in other countries, with a high alert on potential nuclear threats despite the end of the Cold War.⁶ It realigns its national security objectives to advance the Western model defined by spreading liberalism and capitalism in the new world order. In this context, it was and still is crucial for U.S. foreign policy to define and execute its national interests accordingly and realistically; however, Kissinger has observed that by framing its international objectives along

Address to Congress and moreover, to the general public by President Woodrow Wilson in 1913

² Churchill, Winston. “Iron Curtain Speech.” 5 March 1946. Note: This speech provided the basis for the division of the world into two spheres: East and West, where the Soviet Union embodies the East and the Free World is considered the West.

³ Kennan, George. “Article X.” July 1947. Foreign Affairs. Web. 31 July 2017.

⁴ U.S. Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff. “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.” 7 April 1950. U.S. Department of State. Web. 31 July 2017. Note: This report is commonly referred to as “NSC-68,” and was not declassified until 1975, but is commonly cited in the U.S. national security policy over WMD realm throughout and following the Cold War.

⁵ Bush, George H.W., “A Proclamation.” *Proclamation 6073—Thanksgiving Day, 1989*. November 17, 1989. Web 31 July 2017.

⁶ Ferguson, Charles D., Perry, William J., Scowcrowft, Brent. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR, CFR.org. Web. 31 July 2017.

altruistic lines, immoral policies can be perceived as seen in the American quest to achieve absolute security at home and abroad in the 20th century.⁷

Since 1986, the U.S. executive branch has produced 16 national security strategies (NSS) outlining each presidential administration's domestic and international priorities.⁸ Each President from George H.W. Bush through Barack Obama has published detailed reports addressing the lessons to be learned from the past with remarkable consistency emphasizing that U.S. national security policy domestically has been and continues to be driven by remaining engaged in the world, acknowledging that globalization is alive and continues to spread.⁹ Based on the available U.S. NSS reports from H.W. Bush to the Obama Administrations, U.S. national security priorities have shifted from the following over the past 25 years:¹⁰

- President H.W. Bush (1990-1994) a former CIA Director, was focused on initially containing a common enemy (the USSR,) but changed by facing the major challenge of adjusting security policy in a no-longer bipolar world by seeking to delegate international responsibility-sharing to reduce military costs from the Cold War past by calling on Western Alliances (AA, OSCE, NAA, etc.) in light of regional conflicts in the Post-Soviet bloc and the Persian Gulf War. This was viewed as a “New World Order” policy.

- President Clinton (1994-2001) focused on increasing the amount of market democracies and peacekeeping partners via preventive diplomacy and boosting intelligence as support mechanisms for mitigating global refugee and environmental crises that arose from oil shocks, state-sponsored terrorism, and regional conflicts.

⁷ Kissinger, Henry. “An Inquiry into the American National Interest.” *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays*. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 51-97. 1977, 1974, 1969.

⁸ National Security Strategy Archive, “The National Security Strategy Report.” <http://nssarchive.us/> Note: structured chronologically by U.S. Presidential Administration and key international security events and geopolitical initiatives.

⁹ Hicks, Kathleen H., Runde, Daniel F., Wayne, Amb. Tony., Wormuth, Christine. “Perspectives on the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy.” 28 June 2017. CSIS, csis.org

¹⁰ National Security Strategy Archive, “The National Security Strategy Report.” 29 June 2017 <http://nssarchive.us/>

• President Bush (2001-2008) circled back to burden-sharing objectives based on Gulf War policies in addressing transnational challenges with allies i.e. environmental protection in oil-rich countries such as Kuwait, but quickly inherited a post-9/11 national security climate; this caused a major shift in the U.S. national defense approach (primarily in the Middle East) by setting out to tackle the remaining tyrannies of the world, but in practice, invaded Afghanistan, removed the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, conducted a global War on Terror with domestic implications, and focused on the oil and gas market. NATO also expanded by seven countries in 2004.

• President Obama (2008-2017) to combat recurring and new transnational threats – primarily removed troops from Iraq, eliminated Osama bin Laden, updated vast nuclear sanctions programs, and forwarded counterterrorism efforts in light of the rise in diffuse violent extremist networks such as ISIL and al-Qa’ida, – and lead the world in addressing global climate change,¹¹ and widespread pandemics with a multilateral approach. He also normalized relations with Cuba, lifted sanctions on Iran, and began an “Asian Shift” in trade (TPP) and military cooperation.

With strategic economic and political stakes in almost every country in the world, U.S. national interests continued to lie where it believed it could aid nations in need that rely on American support and ideals, nations that are at risk of aggression by other world powers, and those that still pose nuclear threats¹² i.e. Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran; thereby still aligning with Kennan’s rhetoric of exceptionalism in conducting foreign policy. After winning two World Wars, ending the Cold War, and the post-1989 era via its main priority remained being the superior military and economic force worldwide.¹³ Particularly, this grand legacy of U.S.

¹¹ Note: The Paris Climate Accord (also known as the Paris Agreement) was signed during the Obama Administration, took effect shortly before President Trump got elected, and has major consequences for future U.S. national security policy priorities.

¹² NTI, “The Nunn-Lugar Vision.” NTI.org. Web. 1 August 2017. Note: Each President from H.W. to Obama supported and continued to amend the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, which formed a nonproliferation partnership with Moscow in 1991.

¹³ Fried, Daniel. “Read U.S. Diplomat Daniel Fried’s Retirement Speech Warning Against Isolationism.” 25 February 2017. Time. <http://time.com/4682994/diplomat-daniel-fried-retirement-speech/>

national security strategy is evident in cases when the U.S. utilizes military intervention, and when it is faced with when to use nuclear weapons (WMD,) which is only when it absolutely has to: U.S. proliferation strategy stipulates that having nuclear capabilities is a deterrence measure, as seen in the post-Cold War U.S. Administrations.¹⁴ In addition to military action and WMD usage, when the U.S. sets economic sanctions, restructures commercial diplomacy platforms to effectively increase trade for vital resources as seen in U.S.-Saudi Arabia policy over market interests (oil and arms sales,) when it engages in humanitarian aid with new and old allies, and more recently, enhances cybersecurity in light of the rise in terrorism and widespread fear, U.S. national security strategy aligned with a realist Kissinger approach to foreign policy is vital to consider for how the U.S. will define and execute its future national security objectives. Based on the findings from the NSS reports, (and the extent the current Trump Administration's policy on its national security objectives,) U.S. foreign policy emphasized that international peace and a new world order should exist where the U.S. will prosper first and foremost via multilateral, multi-sectoral, and government-civilian-military approach so every other nation can and will follow suit, allowing the U.S. to remain as the global undisputable hegemon.¹⁵

1. U.S. National Security Policy towards China: Implications for East Asia

After the Cold War, a more unipolar system emerged with the U.S. as the world's indispensable leader. America held a unique capability to build a rule-based, open international system. No diplomatic relationship challenges this issue more than the rapidly shifting power balance between the U.S. and China. Theoretically, China's rise as a global power would not trigger U.S. retaliation, so long as the ascendance was through peaceful

¹⁴ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy." Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR. Note: This will be elaborated on with specific policy programs with China, Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.

¹⁵ Hicks, et.al. "Perspectives on the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy." 28 June 2017. CSIS, csis.org

means.¹⁶ The implications of such an ascendance concerns U.S. policy makers, considering its actual behavior and suspicions as some suspect China's economic and military growth to be the groundwork for a grand strategy wherein China replaces the U.S. as global hegemon. The greatest source of divergence in the Sino-American relationship is the perception of each country's intentions and commitment to fair competition. During the first Bush Administration, Bush 41 tried to improve relations following the Reagan Era sanctions – a policy designed to cut-off China from the rest of the world.¹⁷ Bush 41 began with a pragmatic approach in its response to the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstration; it did not want to ruin relations despite widespread disapproval of Beijing's crackdown.¹⁸ Over time, however, Bush 41 drew similarities between China and the former Soviet Union, including Beijing's systemic domestic and regional destabilization, more tensions over the Taiwan Strait, and the U.S. has strong relations with Taiwan.¹⁹ Despite the aforementioned issues, it was in the U.S.' best national security policy interests to engage China as an emerging power to keep its nuclear and military capabilities in check; Bush 41 added China to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).²⁰ Similarly, the Clinton Presidency identified the U.S. interest to encourage an economically open and politically democratic China, and work within the

¹⁶ "Remarks of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo: 'Turning Your Eyes to China.'" *Harvard Gazette Archives*. 10 December 2003.

¹⁷ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1990, 12. Note, full quote: "China, like the Soviet Union, poses a complex challenge as it proceeds inexorably toward major systemic change. China's inward focus and struggle to achieve stability will not preclude increasing interaction with its neighbors as trade and technology advance. Consultations and contact with China will be central features of our policy, lest we intensify the isolation that shields repression. Change is inevitable in China, and our links with China must endure. The United States maintains strong, unofficial, substantive relations with Taiwan where rapid economic and political change is underway. One of our goals is to foster an environment in which Taiwan and the Peoples Republic of China can pursue a constructive and peaceful interchange across the Taiwan Strait."

¹⁸ Knott, Stephen. "George H.W. Bush: Foreign Affairs." Miller Center, University of Virginia. Web. 31 July 2017. <https://millercenter.org/president/bush/foreign-affairs> Note: In June 1989, the Chinese military killed hundreds of peaceful protesters and the U.S. Congress wanted China to face more punishment than 'limited U.S. economic sanctions.'

¹⁹ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1991, 9.

²⁰ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1993, 16.

region to deter nuclear threats.²¹ In 1994, the Clinton Administration prevented a large-scale plutonium production program in the region by implementing the Agreed Framework with North Korea.²² Throughout his Presidency, Clinton continued on this path, applauding China's membership in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).²³ By the end of the Clinton years, U.S. national security strategy also drew parallels to the challenges faced by China and the former USSR, publicly urging democratization only to promote their stability and reduce the risk of WMD. It was also in Washington's interest to boost its economy.²⁴ The second Bush Administration and the Obama Administration held a similar attitude towards U.S.-China foreign policy, but strayed from past nuclear deterrence strategies. Bush 43 identified China's path as having severe consequences to national interests in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, arguing that China must democratize.²⁵ In 2001, China became a WTO member with U.S. support. However, W. Bush, unlike his predecessors, did not engage with Kim Jong Il despite knowing the government had a clandestine uranium enrichment program, which caused the second North Korean nuclear crisis; he referred to the DPRK as "an axis of evil," thereby causing North Korea to withdraw from the NPT, increase its WMD supply, and eliminate any chance of reaching a breakthrough in the two military superpowers' bilateral relations.²⁶ China was North Korea's patron and

²¹ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." 1997, 15.

²² Goodby, James E. "North Korea: The Problem That Won't Go Away." May 1, 2003. Brookings. Brookings.edu. Web. 31 July 2017. Note: Clinton utilized what is commonly referred to as the "Perry Process," which involves engagement with North Korea.

²³ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for A Global Age." 2001, 3.

²⁴ William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union." January 27, 2000.

²⁵ George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America." 2002, 24. Note, full quote: "The United States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. The democratic development of China is crucial to that future."

²⁶ Goodby, James E. "North Korea: The Problem That Won't Go Away." May 1, 2003. Brookings.edu. Web. 31 July 2017.

protector.²⁷ Although Bush 43 strategy stressed multilateralism in trying to terminate North Korea's nuclear program, it did not take the lead: prospects for economic cooperation within the Asia Pacific were run by Russia and China as the interlocutors for infrastructure projects and commercial relations.²⁸ Even Japan had doubts about Bush 43's WMD approach to China and North Korea.²⁹ Unlike Bush 43, the Obama Administration also addressed regional security threats in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea as being vital to U.S. foreign policy priorities; by welcoming Beijing to work with Washington and the international community to address key national security issues such as nonproliferation, economic growth, and military modernization along peaceful lines, the Obama approach vastly differed.³⁰ President held that the U.S.-China relationship is the most important bilateral nexus in the 21st century;³¹ it was (and still is) difficult for China and the U.S. to avoid each's interest in keeping their own nuclear arsenals in light of the enduring disagreement over Taiwan, how to work with Russia, mitigate North Korea, and China's past with

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Note: China did not want the North Korean regime to fall. If it does, that can cause a massive influx of North Korean refugees seeking refuge in China.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Note: The EU and Sweden played an important role in engaging North Korea with the rest of the world during Bush 43.

²⁹ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy." 15. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR. Note, Full quote: "On the one hand, Tokyo is one of the strongest advocates for nuclear disarmament, but on the other, it relies on U.S. nuclear arms for protection. Japanese leaders believe that the long-term sustainability of the nonproliferation regime depends on the nuclear weapon states following through on their commitments to pursue disarmament. Nonetheless, some Japanese officials have expressed concern about whether U.S. nuclear posture provides an effective umbrella for Japan, especially in regard to China."

³⁰ Barack Obama, "National Security Strategy." 2010, 43. Note, full quote: "We welcome a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the United States and the international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation. We will monitor China's military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected."

³¹ Li, Cheng. "Assessing U.S.-China relations under the Obama administration." 30 Aug 2016. Brookings. Brookings.edu. Web 31 July 2017. Note: President Obama also stated that he U.S. and China are the top two worlds greatest economic superpowers.

India and Pakistan (another global nuclear threat,) and more.³² In terms of trade and regional stability, U.S.-Chinese relations remained complex after (1) TPP, (2) how the U.S. sought to improve relations with Japan, which was intended to ameliorate Chinese-Japanese relations, perceived as containment, and (3) the lack of a resolution on the East China Sea with Russia.³³ Currently, the Trump Administration has taken a different approach to U.S.-China policy: the impact China has on the U.S. economy – particularly unemployment – is a sharp issue in U.S. domestic politics. In 2016, Republican candidates spoke on the issue at the Nevada caucus. Despite the Chinese backing of a \$1 billion auto plant in the state, anti-China sentiment was evident from the audience’s applause of those who made accusations against China’s economic practices. Current U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that Chinese currency regulation and “one-sided trade policies” were aimed at harming U.S. interests.³⁴ This animosity toward China is a prime example of the “tendency in each society to blame others for internal difficulties.”³⁵ Trump also stated the following: *“We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country. And that’s what they’re doing. It’s the greatest theft in the history of the world.”*³⁶ This past April, President Trump hosted President Xi Jinping at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida to begin U.S.-China Negotiations, and although the 45th Administration’s policy of “economic nationalism – hostility to multilateral trade agreements,” the One China Policy, and how to address North Korea’s nuclear threat, are alive and well as set forth by Trump chief strategist Steve Bannon, there is still an overall lack of clarity

³² Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” 4. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR. Note: Although China and India have resolved the Border War in 1962, historical tensions remain, causing gridlock at present.

³³ Li, Cheng. “Assessing U.S.-China relations under the Obama administration.” 30 Aug 2016. Brookings. Brookings.edu. Web 31 July 2017. Note: While this piece is an op-ed, it reiterates the aforementioned Obama NSS Reports released in 2010 & 2015.

³⁴ Nash, James. “Nevadans Cheer Trump’s China-Bashing Even as Nation Buoy State.” Bloomberg, Bloomberg.com. 23 February 2016. Web. 9 July 2017. Note, Full Quote: “They’ve taken our jobs, they’ve taken our money, they’ve taken everything. They’ve rebuilt China with our money.”

³⁵ Hachigian, Nina. *Debating China*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 9. Print.

³⁶ Trump, Donald. “Trump Accuses China of ‘Raping’ U.S.” *New York Times*, NYTimes.com. 2 May 2016. Web 10 July 2017.

as to how the Administration conducts its national security policy towards China.³⁷ The results of the Mar-a-Lago meeting demonstrated this: the 100-Day Plan between the two was not completed. Despite remarks on the meeting as “positive and productive,” there are few details to support the White House’s optimistic public remarks.³⁸ China trade and security relations were then linked to North Korea. President Trump recently called President Jinping the President of Taiwan.³⁹ Such symbolism has tremendous consequences for already complex U.S.-Chinese foreign relations. The narrowing power gap between the U.S. and China, along with cybersecurity has intensified mutual suspicion of each other. Despite how both sides, “have long been committed to preventing disagreements from dominating the relationship,” the perception of each other’s “grand strategy” is unsettling.⁴⁰ The remedy for this suspicion then is not blindly trust each other - this is unrealistic. Instead, each side must be especially pragmatic and detail-oriented considering the tenuous equilibrium and high stakes.

2. U.S. National Security Policy towards Russia

Over the past 25 years, U.S.-Russian relations were adversarial and complicated, and are vital for the stabilization of global and economic security.⁴¹ Bush 41 recognized the potential danger of regional conflicts as a result of redrawn borders after the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise in radicalism and terrorism, and access to WMD.⁴² To address this, Bush 41

³⁷ J.A., Democracy in America. “Donald Trump meets Xi Jinping.” The Economist, Economist.com. 6 April 2017. Web. 19 July 2017.

³⁸ Soergel, Andrew. “Analyst: Donald Trump’s China Summit Short on ‘Concrete Deliverables.’” U.S. News & World Report. Usnews.com. 10 April 2017. Web. 20 July 2017.

³⁹ Phillips, Tom. “Wrong China Policy: White House Calls Xi Jinping president of Taiwan.” The Guardian, TheGuardian.com. 9 July 2017. Web. 9 July 2017.

⁴⁰ Hachigian, Nina. *Debating China*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 9. Print.

⁴¹ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

⁴² George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 1990, 6. Note, Full quote: “Instability in areas troubled by poverty, injustice, racial, religious or ethnic tension will continue, whether or not exploited by the Soviets. Religious fanaticism may continue to

sought to reform the relationship with the former USSR via increased multilateralism. Despite its imminent collapse and turmoil in the Gulf, U.S. national security strategy made the former USSR, and its existing structures its top foreign policy priority.⁴³ In efforts to execute this multilaterally, Bush 41 worked with the Kremlin in implementing nuclear deterrence strategies; some examples in Bush 41 national security strategy are the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START,) and the Global Protection System (GPS).⁴⁴ GPS and START served as a blueprint for joint-nonproliferation efforts in order to rebuild diplomatic and commercial relations in light of global nuclear threats.⁴⁵ Similar to Bush 41, the Clinton Administration worked with the Kremlin to reduce the risk of nuclear war in the region by multilateral engagement. START II & START III – a continuation of START that includes additional agreements to “...deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under the Treaty by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to take them out of combat status, thus removing thousands of warheads from alert status years ahead of schedule...” – was agreed upon as a top national security priority between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin.⁴⁶ There were swift changes to US national security policy after the full dissolution of the Soviet Union: Russia’s involvement in states such as Georgia and Moldova, NATO expansion, and the war in Chechnya are some examples.⁴⁷ Russian economic growth through market and democratic reform was also a top national security priority not just for Moscow, but for the other states

endanger American lives, or countries friendly to us in the Middle East, on whose energy resources the free world continues to depend.”

⁴³ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 1993, 6.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 18. Note, Full quote: “At the June 1992 Summit, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed to work together, with allies and other interested states, in developing a concept for a Global Protection System (GPS) against limited ballistic missile attack. Since then, we have discussed GPS in detail with friends, NATO allies, and with high-level representatives of Russia and other former Soviet republics. This commitment to cooperation on a Global Protection System is a landmark in U.S.-Russian relations and will ensure that missile defense can be deployed in a stabilizing manner for the benefit of the community of nations.”

⁴⁵ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 1991, 14.

⁴⁶ Bill Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” 1996, 5.

⁴⁷ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

in the region.⁴⁸ In addition to START II & III, the Clinton Administration further emphasized the need for Russian-NATO cooperation in light of NATO enlargement in order to create a secure post-Cold War European security system.⁴⁹ After the Yeltsin and Clinton presidencies, U.S. national security objectives set forth by both the U.S. and Russia expanded by launching a worldwide nuclear testing ban.⁵⁰ U.S.-Russian relations became increasingly complex with the rise of Vladimir Putin.⁵¹ Bush 43 also sought to reset U.S.-Russian relations in light of national security developments in the new century i.e. in a post-9/11 world.⁵² While Bush 43 continued START and similar initiatives such as SORT, it re-prioritized its stance, indicating that Moscow is no longer an enemy based on the decline of Soviet ideology and communism, the nonproliferation Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions, and joining forces in the War on Terror.⁵³ The Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 did not sever relations, it withdrew from the ABM in 2002, and Russia became a WTO member in 2012.⁵⁴ The Obama Administration sought to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations into the

⁴⁸ William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” 1994, 19.

⁴⁹ William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.” 1996, 22.

⁵⁰ William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” 1997-1999, 7.

⁵¹ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

⁵² George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” 2002, 25.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 27. Note, Full quote: “With Russia, we are already building a new strategic relationship based on a central reality of the twenty-first century: The United States and Russia are no longer strategic adversaries. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions is emblematic of this new reality and reflects a critical change in Russian thinking that promises to lead to productive, long-term relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and the United States. Russia’s top leaders have a realistic assessment of their country’s current weakness and the policies—internal and external—needed to reverse those weaknesses. They understand, increasingly, that Cold War approaches do not serve their national interests and that Russian and American strategic interests overlap in many areas. United States policy seeks to use this turn in Russian thinking to refocus our relationship on emerging and potential common interests and challenges. We are broadening our already extensive cooperation in the global war on terrorism.”

⁵⁴ Ferguson, Charles D., et al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” 4. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 36. April 2009. CFR. Note: Missile proliferation and defense was a vital issue in U.S.-Russia dialogue.

new decade in light of the new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev coming to power after the War on Terror.⁵⁵ The Obama years faced new regional and global geopolitical challenges with Russia, requiring unseen approaches. Specifically, the newest version of START – the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – was signed early on due to the rising threat of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.⁵⁶ Obama security strategy spearheaded a more inclusive gathering of international stakeholders commonly committed to nuclear deterrence, proliferation, and improving U.S.-Russian relations.⁵⁷ In addition to the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, Obama made it a top foreign policy priority to utilize multilateralism, particularly through empowering NATO: U.S.-European allies facilitated more diplomatic dialogue between the U.S. and Russia.⁵⁸ Vladimir Putin’s return as Russian President in late 2011 *and* Russia’s concerns with NATO’s intervention in Libya complicated U.S.-Russian relations.⁵⁹ By trying to work through Moscow’s skepticism towards spread of the Western model, the Obama sought to rebuild a working bilateral relationship.⁶⁰ However, Russia’s seizure of Crimea was an additional strain on U.S.-Russian relations due to

⁵⁵ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web. 9 July 2017.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 27, 2010. Note, Full quote: “To reduce our stockpiles and launchers, while ensuring our deterrent, the United States and Russia are completing negotiations on the farthest-reaching arms control treaty in nearly two decades. And at April’s Nuclear Security Summit, we will bring 44 nations together here in Washington, DC, behind a clear goal: securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in 4 years so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists.”

⁵⁸ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 25, 2011.

⁵⁹ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017. Note: Former VP Joe Biden proposed to “press the reset button” on U.S.-Russian Relations in a speech in Munich a few weeks after the inauguration in 2009.

⁶⁰ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” February 12, 2013. Note, Full quote: “At the same time, we’ll engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals and continue leading the global effort to secure nuclear materials that could fall into the wrong hands, because our ability to influence others depends on our willingness to lead and meet our obligations.”

insecurity of NATO allies.⁶¹ Tensions between the U.S. and Russia never quite subsided following the events in Ukraine, which had a negative spillover effect on the end of the Obama years in its effort to fulfill its top national security goal, which is to monitor and combat ISIL and Al Qaida.⁶² During the current administration, U.S. President Donald Trump has inherited a complex relationship with the Kremlin: one that has arguably not been this volatile since the Cold War Era due to the war in Syria and the alleged Russian interference in the U.S. Presidential Elections in November 2016.⁶³ While Moscow appreciates the Trump Administration's attitude towards NATO, – which differs from the previous administrations adherence to the alliance and multilateral cooperation – it is unclear how the two great powers will move forward. Recently, Presidents Trump and Putin met at the G-20 Summit where they discussed how to move forward with Syria, Ukraine, and cybersecurity – all of which was warmly welcomed and up for discussion to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations.⁶⁴ However, Russia's disapproval of the recent U.S. involvement in Syria where a Syrian fighter plane and drone was shot down, and U.S. sanctions on Russia have increased, further complicate the relationship between the two countries.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 20, 2015. Note, Full quote: “We’re upholding the principle that bigger nations can’t bully the small, by opposing Russian aggression and supporting Ukraine’s democracy and reassuring our NATO allies.”

⁶² Barack Obama, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” January 12, 2016. Note, Full quote: “Even as their economy severely contracts, Russia is pouring resources in to prop up Ukraine and Syria, client states that they saw slipping away from their orbit. Priority number one is protecting the American people and going after terrorist networks. Both Al Qaida and now ISIL pose a direct threat to our people, because in today’s world, even a handful of terrorists who place no value on human life, including their own, can do a lot of damage. They use the Internet to poison the minds of individuals inside our country. We have to take them out.”

⁶³ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul; Weiss, Andrew S., “Illusions vs Reality: Twenty-Five Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, carnegieendowment.org. 9 February 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

⁶⁴ Donald J. Trump, Twitter Post, July 9, 2017, 10:25 AM., <https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump>

⁶⁵ Sampathkumar, Mythili. “Syria war: Tensions between America and Russia escalate as countries clash over drones and airspace.” *The Independent*, Independent.co.uk. 20 June 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

3. U.S. National Security Strategy in the Persian Gulf

To combat future threats to U.S. national security and regional stability within the Greater Middle East (i.e. American allies and potential partners,) Bush 41 emphasized that it stays committed to the following: (1) moving beyond containment, (2) form a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union in light of its military power and provision of WMD to Syria and Libya, (3) facilitate the peace process between Israel and Palestine, and (4) maintain a strong naval presence in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean.⁶⁶ The Persian Gulf War brought about a new set of foreign policy challenges for Bush 41 to achieve its goals.⁶⁷ The notable military acts that took place – Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm – highlighted the first Bush Administration’s dedication to stand up to aggression, protecting the Middle East via promoting long-term peaceful resolution processes, and overall global leadership in the Gulf War in light of national interests and future international partnerships.⁶⁸ Despite liberating Kuwait and facilitating peace talks between Israel and the Arab world,⁶⁹ national security policy was largely driven by economic interests i.e. oil shocks from the Gulf War, while maintaining multinational alliances by calling on international coalitions to push for the Western mold. With regard to nuclear proliferation, Bush 41 sought to engage the Middle East by containing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and attempting to improve U.S.-Iranian relations under the conditions that it will no longer participate in terrorist-related activities and hostage crises.⁷⁰ Additionally, the first Bush Administration sought to restore the balance of power on local and regional levels with the following goals in mind: destabilizing arms sales and

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 9-13.

⁶⁷ George H.W. Bush, “Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 29, 1991. Note: Beginning on August 2, 1990, the 41st Administration during the Gulf War sought to drive Iraq under Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait in order to reestablish regional stability by working with a plethora of multilateral actors – the Arab League, the European Community, the United Nations – in order to reach a diplomatic solution and establish a new world order sans bloodshed.

⁶⁸ George H.W. Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States.” 1993, 4.

⁶⁹ George H.W. Bush, “Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 28, 1992.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 10. Note: The subject of Iran within the first Bush Administration will be analyzed in-depth at a later point in this paper.

carrying forth an increased naval presence in the region, and promoting an Israeli-Palestinian peace process to support Israel's security.⁷¹ Bush 41 also called on multilateral actors to contribute to the three-tiered non-proliferation strategy by opening membership and strengthening existing arrangements, and creating new programs such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.⁷² One of the critical policies regarding nuclear proliferation – the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) – faced skepticism from Congress for increased funding despite its efforts on behalf of the administration to lower nuclear capabilities in Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Syria.⁷³ By the end of Bush 41, the Gulf War ended, but a power vacuum held by the U.S. arose.⁷⁴ President Clinton carried out a similar attitude towards the region after the conclusion of the Gulf War and nonproliferation i.e. CWC.⁷⁵ Much of this ambition to defeat Saddam Hussein and supplying chemical weapons in the region was supported by multilateral efforts, primarily NATO and U.N. weapons inspectors.⁷⁶ However, Clinton recognized and prioritized the Persian Gulf's oil access.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration tried to pursue its Middle East security strategy by involving multilateral actors and acknowledging religious differences.⁷⁸ Bush 43 took a different approach given the events of 9/11 and its ramifications for the U.S. national security climate: there was a rollback of

⁷¹ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1990, 13.

⁷² George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1991, 15.

⁷³ George H.W. Bush, "Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union." January 28, 1992.

⁷⁴ George H.W. Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States." 1993, 4. Note, Full quote: "The United States has taken the lead both to defeat aggression, notably in the Persian Gulf, and to promote peaceful resolution of longstanding conflicts, such as in the Middle East, which threaten international peace and our vital interests."

⁷⁵ William J. Clinton, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union." February 4, 1997. Note, Full quote: "Now we must rise to a new test of leadership, ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention. It will make our troops safer from chemical attack. It will help us to fight terrorism. We have no more important obligations, especially in the wake of what we now know about the Gulf War."

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." 1997-1999, 18. Note, Full quote: "The United States depends on oil for more than 40 percent of its primary energy needs. Roughly half our oil needs are met with imports, and a large, though diminishing, share of these imports come from the Persian Gulf area."

⁷⁸ William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." 2001, 65.

containment, and reliance on preemption and justifying the use of offensive force, stipulating that terrorist networks are borderless, citizenless, and have chaotic dictators with mass WMD scattered in the region.⁷⁹ Particularly, Bush 43 was concerned with counterterrorism efforts in the War on Terror and stopping Al Qaida.⁸⁰ In invading Afghanistan in 2001, Yemen in 2002, and Iraq in 2003, Bush 43 national security policy sought to ensure safety at home and military prowess abroad over the next five years while bringing U.S. national interests in the Middle East to the forefront.⁸¹ This most definitely did not take place: The Afghan and Iraq Wars caused a sharp increase in civilian casualties and troop requirements by 2006, followed by a shift in the Bush 43 narrative to go after the Taliban in Pakistan and Iraq *and* Al-Qaida under a “return on success” policy (causing an additional 20,000 US Troops surge in the region,) and violated treaty rights per a Supreme Court Case (*Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* concerning holding prisoners in Guantanamo,) and the national fear of constantly being watched under the Terrorist Surveillance Program, respectively.⁸² Although there was evidence of nuclear-motivated terrorists in the region and Pakistan, the War on Terror could have been prevented.⁸³ The Taliban was toppled in 2001 in Afghanistan, yet there were approximately 210,000 civilian casualties as of 2015.⁸⁴ Obama adhered to standing by its allies and protecting national interests in its foreign policy in the Gulf by utilizing a hands-off approach in invading countries in the region, and sought to engage Muslim communities around the world via collective action and

⁷⁹ George W. Bush, “Bush’s Speech at West Point.” 1 June 2002. NYTimes. Web. 1 August 2017.

⁸⁰ George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 28, 2003.

⁸¹ George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 28, 2008.

⁸² Greg II, Gary L. “George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs.” UVA Miller Center. Web. 1 August 2017. Note: Bush 43 “return on success” policy stipulated that the more secure America is at home, the faster troops can return from the War on Terror.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Watson Institute, International & Public Affairs. “Civilians Killed & Wounded.” Brown University. March 2015. Web. 1 August 2017. Note: This death toll has not been updated since March 2015.

multilateralism.⁸⁵ In practice, the Administration recognized its national interests on a broader regional scale by utilizing multinational institutions within the region such as the Gulf Cooperation Council.⁸⁶ Despite its shortcomings in addressing the rise of ISIL partly due to prematurely withdrawing troops from Iraq (2011,) falling short in the no-drama approach in providing military aid in Syria (2011-12,) overthrowing Gadhafi without monitoring the resulting national chaos in Libya, and supporting Egypt's autocrat al-Sisi, Obama did not abandon Afghanistan due to vital operational bases in the war-torn fragile state dealing with its Pakistani foes on the Pashtun belt.⁸⁷ What did persist over the past four administrations, however, was the U.S. willingness to work with Saudi Arabia due to oil interests as the world's largest crude reserves holder. The disagreements over prospects for the Kingdom to ameliorate its relationship with Israel, Saudi intervention in the 2015 War in Yemen, disapproval in the no-drama approach to Syria and Egypt, how to disarm a nuclear Iran, and its human rights injustices ensued.⁸⁸ It is clear that the U.S. relationship with the Gulf Kingdoms remained an important national security priority from the end of the Gulf War due to common business interests and economic ties.⁸⁹ President Trump faces different issues i.e. the escalation of ISIL in the Middle East, and particularly the ongoing Civil War in Syria. Some of President Trump's foreign policy goals include getting the "...Gulf States to pay for safe zones in Syria 'because they have nothing but money,' and to build an Arab coalition to roll back Iranian influence in

⁸⁵Barack Obama, "National Security Strategy." 2010, 3-4.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 45. Note, Full quote: "We have an array of enduring interests, longstanding commitments and new opportunities for broadening and deepening relationships in the greater Middle East. This includes maintaining a strong partnership with Israel while supporting Israel's lasting integration into the region. The U.S. will also continue to develop our key security relationships in the region with such Arab states as with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—partnerships that enable our militaries and defense systems to work together more effectively."

⁸⁷O'Hanlan, Michael. "Obama the Carpenter: The President's National Security Legacy." Brookings. May 2015. Web 1 Aug 2017. Note: Obama's Middle East foreign policy is commonly referred to as the no-drama and the hands-off approach.

⁸⁸ CFR.org Staff, "U.S.-Saudi Relations." CFR. 12 May 2017. Web. 1 August 1, 2017.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

the region...and negotiating peace between Israel and the Palestinians.”⁹⁰ Also, President Trump has had business interests in the region for over 20 years (and continues to retain them while holding office,) and “is backing Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because Qatar is ‘a funder of terror at a very high level.’”⁹¹ He launched the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center to be co-chaired by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, and will include the GCC states as members.⁹² President Trump made his first foreign visit to the Middle East and Europe with its first stop in Saudi Arabia, which was insisted by the Trump national security team as a trip for human rights and to discourage radicalization. With the first stop as Saudi Arabia – a host to 9/11 extremists with a dismal human rights record, – there is disagreement between the Pentagon and the State Department.⁹³ With Qatar, which is currently accused as a site for housing terrorists, the President reached out to Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani over the phone in early February amidst the attempted travel ban from several Middle Eastern countries.⁹⁴ Currently, there is also discrepancy between President Trump’s and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s national security strategy on how to proceed with Qatar: “the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command and home to some 10,000 American troops,” and of which President Trump supports the Qatar blockade and Tillerson does not.⁹⁵ Under the current administration, U.S. nonproliferation policy has indicated a willingness to work with the Saudis on containing Iran and its nuclear capabilities to expand in the rest of the region.⁹⁶

⁹⁰Sokolsky, Richard.; Miller, Aaron. “Trump Thinks He’ll Get a Great Deal From the Gulf Arab States. Good Luck With That.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 7 March 2017. Web 9 July 2017.

⁹¹ Kirkpatrick, David D. “Trump’s Business Ties in the Gulf Raise Questions About His Allegiances.” New York Times. 18 June 2017. Web 10 July 2017.

⁹² Donald Trump, “President Trump’s Speech to the Arab Islamic American Summit.” Whitehouse.gov. 21 May 2017. Web. 10 July 2017.

⁹³ Cohen, Eliot A. “What Did Trump Accomplish on His First Foreign Trip?” The Atlantic. 28 May 2017. Web. 10 July 2017.

⁹⁴ BBC U.S. & Canada, “What has President Trump said about your country in his first 100 days?” BBC.com. 27 April 2017. Web. 10 July 2017.

⁹⁵Kelemen, Michele. “In an Afternoon, Trump and Tillerson Appear to Contradict Each Other on Qatar.” NPR.org. 9 June 2017. Web. 10 July 2017.

⁹⁶ CFR.org Staff, “U.S.-Saudi Relations.” CFR. 12 May 2017. Web. 1 August 1, 2017.

4. U.S.-Iran National Security Strategy

Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, U.S. national security strategy toward Iran has primarily centered on its aims to contain and implement negotiations to combat Iranian support for terrorism, threats to Israel, and potential expansion of its nuclear arsenal. From remaining open to an improved relationship with Tehran following the hostage crisis and funding and supplying terrorist groups with WMD during the first Bush Administration, to the Clinton Administration imposing an economic embargo while working with multilateral actors such as the G-7 and post-Soviet states to implement additional COCOM export controls to limit WMD sales in efforts to maintain peace in the Greater Middle East, to Bush 41's strategy "...to block the threats posed by the regime (i.e. thwarting Middle East peace and sponsoring terrorism by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites thereby violating international nonproliferation treaties such as a) while expanding our engagement and outreach to the people the regime is oppressing," and finally by the end of the Obama Administration, the U.S. led a global sanctions regime to rollback its nuclear proliferation. In addition to wanting to maintain an international world order without nuclear weapons, one of the main reasons behind the aforementioned U.S.-Iran national security policies is due to its regional consequences: "other states, particularly in the Middle East, are starting nuclear power programs modeled after that of Iran." Currently, Iran is bound to the Iran Deal set forth by the IAEA during the latter end of Obama's presidency (implemented January 2016,) stipulating that the following sanctions will remain in place: terror list, missile technology, ballistic missiles, human rights abuses, and destabilizing regional activities including in Syria and Yemen. Without the Iran Deal set forth by both Bush Presidencies urging to impose economic sanctions rather than military ones, and implemented by Obama, Iran would have the nuclear capability to emulate North Korea. This would have colossal regional security consequences if the Trump Administration continues to oppose the Iran Deal, despite its 6 months of adhering to previous Middle East policies.

5. U.S.-Turkey National Security Strategy

Similarly, U.S. national security strategy and how it deals with Turkish foreign policy has been vital yet challenging in preserving regional stability. From Bush 41's dealings with Turkey's domestic Kurdish issue over Operation Provide Comfort amidst the Gulf War where the U.S. provided support for Iraqi Kurds,⁹⁷ to Clinton's policy of careful enlargement with Turkish viability of entering the EU as a vital NATO ally in Bosnia, the NIS, and the Middle East despite the Cyprus issue troubling reconciliation with Greece,⁹⁸ to Bush 43 strongly opposing Turkey's Kurdish policy against in Iraq during the War on Terror,⁹⁹ to the Obama Administration emphasizing Turkey's vital geostrategic role as a NATO

⁹⁷ Gunter, Andrew. "Insight Turkey, Vol.13." No.2. 98. 2011. Web 31 July 2017. Note, Full quote: "To abandon OPC, however, would alienate Washington and strip Ankara of important influence over the course of events. OPC, for example, enabled Turkey to launch military strikes into Iraqi Kurdistan against the PKK at almost any time. If the United States refused to allow such Turkish incursions, Turkey could threaten to withdraw its permission for OPC. Although it might have seemed ironic that an operation that was supposed to protect the Iraqi Kurds was allowing Turkey to attack the Turkish Kurds as well as in ICT collateral damage on the hosting Iraqi Kurds, such was the logic of the Kurdish imbroglio and part of the dilemma for America foreign policy."

⁹⁸William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century." 1997-1999. 22-23. Note, Full quote: "There are significant security challenges in southeastern Europe. The interrelated issues of Cyprus, Greek-Turkish disagreements in the Aegean, and Turkey's relationship with Europe have serious consequences for regional stability and the evolution of European political and security structures; thus, our immediate goals are to stabilize the region by reducing long-standing Greek-Turkish tensions and to pursue a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus. A democratic, secular, stable and western-oriented Turkey has supported U.S. efforts to enhance stability in Bosnia, the NIS and the Middle East, as well as to contain Iran and Iraq. Its continued ties to the West and its support for our overall strategic objectives in one of the world's most sensitive regions is critical. We continue to support Turkey's active, constructive role within NATO and Europe."

⁹⁹ Gunter, Andrew. "Insight Turkey, Vol.13." No.2. 101. 2011. Web 31 July 2017. Note, Full quote: "The new situation was further illustrated in July 2003 when the United States apprehended eleven Turkish commandos in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Sulaymaniya who were apparently seeking to carry out acts intended to destabilize the de facto Kurdish government in northern Iraq. Previously, as the strategic ally of the United States, Turkey had carte blanche to do practically anything it wanted to in northern Iraq. No longer was this true. The "Sulaymaniya incident" caused what one high-ranking Turkish general called the "worst crisis" to which the United States was willing to protect the Iraqi Kurds from unwanted Turkish interference. What is more, Washington now began to reject Turkish proposals that either the United States eliminate the PKK guerrillas holed up in northern Iraq or permit the Turkish army to do so."

ally despite the U.S. concern for Kurdish rights,¹⁰⁰ it is in the U.S. best national interests to reform its partnership with Ankara.¹⁰¹ While Turkey has been a NATO ally since 1952, which by nature brought the country more deeply involved in Western affairs and ideals of democracy,¹⁰² its foreign policy of Zero Problems with Its Neighbors has failed and strained its relations with the West. The inability to resolve the Cyprus issue has resulted in a complicated relationship with the U.S due to the strong Greek voices in the congressional lobby to disseminate the Turkish military presence in Cyprus: a similar phenomenon to the prominent Armenian lobby in Washington that pushes for Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide.¹⁰³ It has become increasingly difficult for the West to work with President Erdogan and the AKP on controlling the rise in migration in the region and increased terrorist activity in the Middle East. Turkey is increasingly being drawn to the Arab Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, due to its heavy trade relationship with many key Gulf States and its interest in maintaining security and stability in its own backyard. The recurring themes and regional problems that affect Saudi Arabia such as energy security, pipeline diplomacy, and rising Iran are also critical to Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey's increasing engagement with the Middle East enhanced its strategic posture and bolstered its leadership as a peacemaker especially as a strategic partner to many Arab states, Israel, and the United States. Soon after September 11, 2001, Turkey seemed to represent not

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 100-102. Note, Full quote: "Although the United States had always paid lip service to the idea of Kurdish rights, whenever it was necessary to make a choice, the United States always backed its strategic NATO ally Turkey on the Kurdish issue...the United States has very strongly opposed the "bad" Kurds of the PKK. Turkey's longtime and continuing geostrategically important position as a U.S. NATO ally is clearly the main reason for this situation."

¹⁰¹ Council on Foreign Relations, Task Force Report, "US-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership," 3. May 2012. Note, Full quote: "To make the vision for a new U.S.-Turkey partnership a reality, Ankara and Washington should observe the following principles: •equality and mutual respect for each other's interests; •confidentiality and trust; •close and intensive consultations to identify common goals and strategies on issues of critical importance; •avoidance of foreign policy surprises; and •recognition and management of inevitable differences between Washington and Ankara."

¹⁰² Fuller, Graham. "The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World." United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008. 152.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 153.

only a crucial Muslim ally in the war against terrorism but also a unique example of secularism and democracy in the Islamic world. In that sense, Ankara's active presence in the anti-terror alliance strengthened the point that the war on terror is not a crusade against Islam. In the words of President Bush, Turkey has "provided Muslims around the world with a hopeful model of a modern and secular democracy." With regard to national security risks, the U.S. should push Turkey to respect its minorities i.e. the Kurds living in Iraq and Syria as they are supporting military efforts to dismantle ISIS and ISIL, ameliorate its relations with Israel and become the middle man between Iran and the rest of the region as it once did in the past.¹⁰⁴ However, this solution is not that simple. America's invasion of Iraq and the ensuing problems in the country threaten 50 years of Turkish-American strategic partnership. Differences over Iraq – the Turkish parliament's March 1, 2003 refusal to allow U.S. forces access to Turkish territory for the invasion, and Turkish frustration over American support for Iraqi Kurds – have led to unprecedented mutual resentment between Ankara and Washington. In the past, Ankara could always rely on its solid strategic partnership with Washington in case things went wrong with Europe. Such an alternative may now no longer exist. Most Turks believe the U.S. has betrayed its promises to prevent Kurdish domination of Northern Iraq and is now maintaining a "double-standard" about fighting terrorism. These developments put the U.S. under an extremely negative light in the eyes of Turkish public opinion. During 2005, a colorful example of Turkey's frustration with the U.S. was a best-selling fictional novel depicting a Turkish-American war over Kirkuk. Moreover, Turks have not gotten over their anger over a July 4, 2003 incident in which U.S. forces in northern Iraq arrested a dozen Turkish Special Forces troops and detained them, hooded, for 24 hours. According to a June 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, anti-Americanism in Turkey is now the highest in the world – ahead of Pakistan, Egypt and Palestinian territories. Ankara's longstanding fear that Kurdish nationalists would dominate northern Iraq – thereby setting a precedent for Turkey's own 15 million Kurds – has now

¹⁰⁴ Pope, Hugh. "PaxOttomana: The Mixed Success of Turkey's New Foreign Policy" *Foreign Affairs*, December 2010. 171.

become reality. A great majority of Turks, including senior military leaders, blame Washington for this development, as well as for the re-emergence of Kurdish terrorism within Turkey. Turkey is no longer a serious E.U. candidate, has been exposed for its ISIL ties, and is increasingly isolated. Currently, President Trump has longstanding business interests in Turkey (similar to those in Riyadh and in Baku,) was praised by President Erdogan for his positive response to the July 2016 coup attempt and was congratulated on winning the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.¹⁰⁵ After meeting in May, however, relations remain strained.¹⁰⁶

6. U.S.-Caucasus National Security Strategy

The past 25 years of U.S. national security policy have had to “confront three countries that were entirely new to U.S. foreign policy in this region.”¹⁰⁷ During the first Bush Administration, which emphasized a smooth and democratic transition for post-Soviet countries after the end of the Cold War, President H.W. Bush had a Kissinger-realist approach.¹⁰⁸ While maintaining regional conflicts and providing warning signs of having a lot of nationalism were at the forefront of Bush 41 policy in the post-Soviet bloc, the U.S. did not have too many vital national interests in the region, except oil and gas.¹⁰⁹ Clinton did recognize the national interests at stake in the Caucasus, primarily by addressing the frozen Nagorno-

¹⁰⁵ Kenney, Carolyn,; Norris, John. “Trump’s Conflicts of Interest in Turkey.” Center for American Progress. 14 June 2017. Web. 2 August 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Sanchez, Raf. “4 things you need to know about Donald Trump’s meeting with Turkish President Erdogan.” The Telegraph. 16 May 2017. Web. 30 August 2017.

¹⁰⁷ Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul. “U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus Take Three.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 31 May 2017. Web. 11 July 2017.

¹⁰⁸ George W. Bush, “Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” February 9, 1989. Note, Full quote: “And it’s a time of great change in the world, and especially in the Soviet Union. But I’ve personally assured General Secretary Gorbachev that at the conclusion of such a review we will be ready to move forward. We will not miss any opportunity to work for peace. The fundamental facts remain that the Soviets retain a very powerful military machine in the services of objectives which are still too often in conflict with ours. So, let us take the new openness seriously, but let’s also be realistic. And let’s always be strong.”

¹⁰⁹ William J. Clinton, “A New Security Strategy for A New Century.” 1997-1999, 22-23.

Karabakh conflict and Caspian oil.¹¹⁰ Another national security goal set forth by the Clinton Administration that was applied to the Caucasus was its emphasis on multilateralism, particularly through the OSCE.¹¹¹ By the early 2000s, the second Bush Administration, even while preoccupied with the War on Terror, did recognize other parts of the Caucasus as being vital to U.S. national security interests: Georgia is a prime example of this – where the U.S. supported Georgia’s efforts in the Rose Revolution in 2003 and in its war against Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.¹¹² Bush 41 essentially applauded Georgia’s decision-making as it aligned with U.S. national interests to spread liberal capitalism and the Western model.¹¹³ To this end, the Obama Administration inherited problems with Russia over U.S. support for Georgia during the 2008 Crisis.¹¹⁴ As a result, its national security strategy towards the Caucasus called for a democratic and multilateral resolve to regional conflicts via the Trans-Atlantic community at-large i.e. NATO.¹¹⁵ U.S. officials have visited Georgia, and the President

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 24. Note, Full quote: “A stable and prosperous Caucasus and Central Asia will help promote stability and security from the Mediterranean to China and facilitate rapid development and transport to international markets of the large Caspian oil and gas resources, with substantial U.S. commercial participation. While the new states in the region have made progress in their quest for sovereignty, stability, prosperity and a secure place in the international arena, much remains to be done—in particular in resolving regional conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh.”

¹¹¹ William J. Clinton, “A New Security Strategy for A New Global Age.” 2001. 46. Note, Full quote: “The United States will continue to give strong support to the OSCE as our best choice to engage all the countries of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in an effort to advance democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and to encourage them to support one another when instability, insecurity, and human rights violations threaten peace in the region.”

¹¹² Rumer, Eugene; Sokolsky, Richard; Stronski, Paul. “U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus Take Three.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 31 May 2017. Web. 11 July 2017.

¹¹³ George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union.” January 28, 2008. Note, Full quote: “Our foreign policy is based on a clear premise: We trust that people, when given the chance, will choose a future of freedom and peace. In the last 7 years, we have witnessed stirring moments in the history of liberty. We’ve seen citizens in Georgia and Ukraine stand up for their right to free and fair elections.”

¹¹⁴ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” xi. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 27 April 2009. CFR.

¹¹⁵ Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy.” 2010. 42. Note, Full quote: “We will remain dedicated to advancing stability and democracy in the Balkans and to resolving conflicts in the Caucasus and in Cyprus. We will continue to engage with Turkey on a broad range of mutual goals, especially with regard to pursuit of stability in its region.”

did host several Georgian officials including Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili at the White House on May 8th, 2017, and applauded the country of Georgia for its “decision to pursue integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO.”¹¹⁶ While this appraisal can be viewed as one of fulfilling the longstanding U.S. national interest to create a liberal capitalist world order under the Western model, it has and may continue to upset Moscow: a staunch opponent of Georgia joining NATO and its desire to join the EU and NATO.¹¹⁷ Toward the end of the Obama Administration and in the current Trump Administration, involvement in the region has been reduced as policy primarily appears focused on fighting ISIL and economic ties in the region. Particularly, the U.S. has trade and investment i.e. oil interests in Azerbaijan,¹¹⁸ which overshadows its human rights and democratic failures. Furthermore, the U.S. understands the longstanding ‘Divided Azerbaijan’ concept¹¹⁹ as leverage over Iran, fueling national and separatist sentiment and language in an already weakened bilateral relationship.¹²⁰ As a Northern neighbor of Iran, this has severe consequences for U.S.-Armenian ties: the U.S. Embassy in Armenia is the largest in the Middle East and South Caucasus, yet without a clear strategy to address the ongoing Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the ‘Divided Azerbaijan’ concept, tensions ensue.¹²¹ While Moscow and Yerevan have strong relations, the U.S. and Russia do not fight over Armenia; this is an issue where the two countries share a common goal: to support Armenia’s security goals and development. In U.S. Ambassador Richard Mills’ most

¹¹⁶ Wigglesworth, Alex. “Trump welcomes Georgia’s prime minister.” Los Angeles Times. 8 May 2017. Web 11 July 2017.

¹¹⁷ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” xi. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 82. April 2009. CFR.

¹¹⁸ U.S. Embassy in Azerbaijan. “U.S.-Azerbaijan Relations.” U.S. Department of State. <https://az.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/us-azerbaijan-relations/> Web. 13 September 2017.

¹¹⁹ Nassibli, Nasib L.. “Azerbaijan- Iran Relations: Challenges and Prospects.” Harvard Kennedy School, November 30, 1999.

¹²⁰ Atabaki, Touraj. “Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran.” I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2000.

¹²¹ Urchik, Daniel. “A Cost-Efficient Investment: Enhancing US-Azerbaijan Relations.” Diplomatic Courier. 19 April 2017. Web. 13 September 2017.

<https://www.diplomaticcourier.com/cost-efficient-investment-enhancing-us-azerbaijan-relations/>

recent speech, he discussed the prospect of providing Armenia more tools to make Armenia a more sovereign state.¹²² On Washington's end, the role of the Armenian lobby primarily over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide remains as a determining factor in U.S.-Armenian relations; it serves as the second largest ethnic lobby in the U.S., which further complicates U.S.-Turkish and Turkish-Armenian relations in the region.¹²³ The current Administration has no policy or previous dealings with Yerevan, and did not use the term 'genocide' on this past April 24th, which is known as Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day.¹²⁴

Conclusion

To conclude, twenty-five years after the post-Soviet states are still transitioning from a bipolar world, U.S. foreign policy resumed to operate under containment, deterrence, nonproliferation, and democracy and Western values abroad in order to protect U.S. interests. According to the NSS Reports and SOTU Addresses analyzed, U.S. foreign policy recognized the need to enhance these policies realistically by maintaining a prominent naval presence, multilateral cooperation, increasing access to trade and market openness, improving its cybersecurity and counterterrorism tactics, and moreover, restoring the balance of power that has been offset since the collapse of the USSR. On paper and in front of the U.S. Congress, U.S. Presidents over the past 25 years delivered promises they could not keep, primarily in preventing nuclear arsenals from expanding, a complex set of challenges set forth by Russia's hot and cold nuclear defense planning, uncertainties in China's strategic development in East Asia, and the turmoil in the Middle East from the Gulf War to the ongoing War on Terror and the rise of transnational terrorist networks such

¹²² Mills, Amb. Richard. "Armenian PM, US Ambassador discuss bilateral mutual cooperation." 25 August 2017. Web. 30 August 2017. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/903097/armenian-pm-us-ambassador-discuss-bilateral-mutual-cooperation.html>

¹²³ Note: The largest ethnic lobby in the U.S. is the Jewish one.

¹²⁴ Trump, Donald J. "Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Armenian Remembrance Day 2017." The White House, Office of the Press Secretary." 24 April 2017. Web. 30 August 2017.

as ISIL.¹²⁵ Therefore, it is imperative for the Trump Administration to prioritize the rebuilding of bilateral relations with Russia and China as previous Presidents attempted to via multilateral cooperation and nuclear treaties. “America First” national security strategy as set out by Chief Strategist Steve Bannon and top Trump security advisors have been putting forth.¹²⁶ As of August 2, 2017, Congress and President Trump implemented new economic sanctions on Russia, further complicating current U.S. security strategy towards Moscow, Iran, North Korea, and potentially the rest of the world by instigating what the Kremlin refers to as a trade war.¹²⁷ That has expanded with diplomatic counter measures. Nevertheless, the Trump Administration can learn from the lessons from the past national strategies abroad in order to protect American interests at home such as making realistic budget cuts in light of spending billions of dollars on nuclear detection equipment from the War on Terror, and enhance its cybersecurity capabilities via increased intelligence sharing for the future of when and how the U.S. uses its nuclear weapons complex.¹²⁸ In terms of economic policy i.e. the ‘capitalist’ part in spreading the Western model, it remains to be seen where the Trump Administration ends up on international trade; ending TPP and possibly exiting TTIP, NAFTA, and the WTO would appear to undo all of the progress in creating and spreading the liberal economic model order set forth by its predecessors.¹²⁹

¹²⁵Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” xi. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 7. April 2009. CFR.

¹²⁶Hicks, Kathleen H., Runde, Daniel F., Wayne, Amb. Tony., Wormuth, Christine. “Perspectives on the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy.” 28 June 2017. CSIS, csis.org. Note: Panelists commonly cite the H.R. McMaster and Gary Cohn op-ed outlining the “America first doesn’t mean America alone” national security strategy as a blueprint for Trump’s first NSS report.

¹²⁷Rampton, Roberta,; Zengerle, Patricia. “Trump signs Russia sanctions bill, Moscow calls it ‘trade war.’ Reuters. 2 August 2017. Web. 3 August 2017. Note, Full quote: “Trump’s litany of concerns about the sanctions, which also affect Iran and North Korea, raised the question of how vigorously Trump will implement them regarding Russia. ‘While I favor tough measures to punish and deter aggressive and destabilizing behavior by Iran, North Korea, and Russia...’”

¹²⁸ Ferguson, Charles D., et. al. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy.” xi. Independent Task Force Report No. 62. 69. April 2009. CFR.

¹²⁹Hicks, Kathleen H., Runde, Daniel F., Wayne, Amb. Tony., Wormuth, Christine. “Perspectives on the 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy.” 28 June 2017. CSIS, csis.org.

On a broad level, it is safe to say that the national security challenges at present must be resolved by having clear and shared goals at home in order to have a successful strategy to address them.¹³⁰ In President Obama's letter to President Trump, he wrote:

*“Second, American leadership in this world really is indispensable. It’s up to us, through action and example, to sustain the international order that’s expanded steadily since the end of the Cold War, and upon which our own wealth and safety depend.”*¹³¹

But, the current Administration is disruptive and unpredictable. Obama's advice followed the theme of his predecessors to maintain global security and reduce threats. The Trump Administration has changed the priorities so that U.S. policies are now in a transitional phase. Whether traditions return or an “America First” policy prevails, ignoring the transitional, disruptive situation of 2017 creates more risk than that of the past twenty-five years.

¹³⁰ Porter, Michael. *Shared Vision, Common Goals: A Better Framework for Problem Solving*. No Labels, Governor Jon Huntsman & Senator Joe Lieberman. 67. Note, Full quote: “I can’t think of a more important priority in America today than defining our shared goals as a nation, and having a national strategy to address them.”

¹³¹ Obama, Barack. “Inauguration Day Parting Letter.” Full Text Available, Liptak, Kevin. “Exclusive: Read the Inauguration Day letter Obama left for Trump.” 4 September 2017. CNN Politics. Web. 5 September 2017.

**ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԴԻՆԱՄԻԿԱ: ԱՄԵՐԻԿԱՅԻ ՄԻԱՑՅԱԼ ՆԱՀԱՆԳՆԵՐԻ ԱՐՏԱՔԻՆ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԱՌԱՋՆԱՀԵՐԹՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ
(ՌՈՒՍԱՍՏԱՆ, ՉԻՆԱՍՏԱՆ, ՊԱՐՍԻՑ ԾՈՑ, ԿՈՎԿԱՍ, ԹՈՒՐԲԻԱ, ԻՐԱՆ)**

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***Բանալի բառեր:** ԱՄՆ, Հարավային Կովկաս, Մեծ Մերձավոր Արևելք, Ջ.Վ. Բուշ, Դ. Թրամփ, ազգային անվտանգություն, արտաքին քաղաքականություն, Ռուսաստան, Չինաստան, Ծոց, Թուրքիա, Իրան*

Հոդվածի հիմնական նպատակն է վերանայել և վերլուծել վերջին 25 տարիների ԱՄՆ-ի ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարությունը՝ արտաքին քաղաքականության շահերին համապատասխան, որպեսզի ավելի լավ հասկանանք դրանց հետևանքները Հարավային Կովկասում և Մեծ Մերձավոր Արևելքում: Հոդվածում ներկայացված է ԱՄՆ-ի ազգային շահերը՝ սկսած Ջ.Վ. Բուշի նախագահության տարիներից մինչև ներկայիս նախագահ Դ. Թրամփի նախագահությունը: Այնուհետև ամփոփվում է, թե ինչպես է յուրաքանչյուր վարչակազմ վարում իր արտաքին քաղաքականությունը ՉԺՀ-ի, ՌԴ-ի, Մեծ Մերձավոր Արևելքի, Իրանի, Թուրքիայի և Հարավային Կովկասի հետ: Վերջում ամփոփ ներկայացվում են Թրամփի վարչակարգում ներառված քաղաքական նկատառումներ՝ անցում նեոլիբերալ բազմակողմանի մոտեցումից՝ «Նախ ԱՄՆ-ն» քաղաքականությանը: