

EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND WIDER SOUTH CAUCASUS

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Introduction

The proposed paper is an attempt to examine the EU foreign and security policy within two major thematic contexts: Turkish-Armenian relations and Wider South Caucasus region, and to identify major features of the EU policy in light of regional processes. The analysis of the above mentioned requires comprehensive revision of several important aspects that determine EU policy in the region in general and in Turkish-Armenian relations in particular.

These aspects particularly include analysis of the general logic of EU Foreign policy development after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the rethinking of EU Neighborhood and Enlargement policy, the revision of ENP and launch of Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Barcelona Process (Euro-Med) an attempt have regional focuses in ENP.

Another important aspect of the process relates to the EU-NATO relations in light of rethinking of the EU security with regard to global security threats that EU is facing as a more organized political entity after Lisbon Treaty has entered into force.

Finally the involvement of the EU in regional processes, its relations with the three EaP countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Iran and Turkey should be taken into account bearing in mind foreign policy and security priorities that EU has set for itself. The paper will touch upon several important priorities, such as energy, communication, trade, migration, conflicts and terrorism threat that are all set as key priorities for

the EU in its Global Strategy and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Russian factor should also be taken into account due to strong Russian presence in the region, traditional Russia-Turkey-Iran triangle, as well as involvement of Russia in important processes around the region: Ukraine and Syria.

Wider South Caucasus is a conditional term that includes three South Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), as well as Russia, Iran and Turkey. This region is a crossroad for serious geopolitical processes with significant infrastructural potential and numerous threats and challenges including conflicts, migration, and governance issues.

The ENP revision and launching of two neighborhood initiatives: Eastern Partnership for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) that involves 15 neighbors to the EU's south in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans region; has given even more weight to the Wider South Caucasus region since geographically it is the meeting point of the Southern and Eastern Neighborhoods of the EU.

EU Foreign and Security Policy before Lisbon Treaty

The period between the end of Cold War and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was essential for forming the present day EU. The events of the last decade of the 20th century, such as conflicts in Balkans and 9/11, have convinced the EU that it should have a joint foreign and security strategy that will allow the Union to be more prepared to the challenges of the changing world.

After the official establishment of the European Union in 1992 the three fundamental pillars of the EU were formed in accordance with the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. This reform has expanded the supranational functions of the EU: the previously functioning European Economic Community which was the major supranational instrument before the three pillar system was modified and the European Communities became the supranational body working on internal economic, social and environmental issues. The Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) were formed to coordinate the fight against crime on the

EU level. Finally, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were formed to carry out foreign policy and military matters. In fact by establishment the three pillars the EU has started the process of institutionalization and expanding as a multifunctional supranational entity.

The post-Cold War period was crucial for the EU in terms of identification of its political borders. The three waves of enlargement in 1995, 2004 and 2007 have more or less formed the political geography of the EU and the major consolidation of the European Union was completed. This was followed by two extremely important steps:

- a. Adoption of the Lisbon Treaty as a comprehensive set of internal rules,
- b. Reflection on EUs further Enlargement and Neighborhood policy and as a result more institutionalized frameworks for initiatives focusing on eastern and southern neighbors, aiming at setting the margins of the EU membership.

This reflection also brought up a necessity to identify key threats and challenges for the EU in post-Cold War world. Establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and creation of the External Action Service have in fact formalized the European Union as a global political actor and gave the EU mechanisms necessary to jointly identify security and foreign policy priorities for EU member states. The European Security Strategy adopted by the EU in 2003 was one of the first serious steps to form a joint foreign and security agenda for EU member states. The 4 major threats identified in this document were Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organized Crime¹.

The structural changes in the EU after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty illustrate that joint efforts to ensure EU security and defense, as well as further positioning of the EU as a global power and more active involvement in global politics as one entity are explicitly prioritized. The fact that the second highest position established by the Treaty which is the Vice-president of the Commission is combined with the position of High

¹ A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, available at (14. 07. 2017) <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, as well as establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) can be considered as major signs of this prioritization.

But unlike state-powers the EUs practice and working style as a global actor is less direct and straightforward due to a number of reasons. First of all the decision making process in the EU, particularly after the Enlargement, is multilateral and time consuming, secondly the major tools that EU uses in foreign policy are based on the internal structural logic of the Union, i.e. the economic cooperation, financial assistance and integrative mechanisms are offered by the EU to external partners as a benefit for cooperation, while disintegration, economic sanctions, cutting financial assistance and limitations of mobility are used as major pressure mechanisms.

Being a regional economic, social and political integration product, the logic of EUs relations with its neighbors can be perceived as foreign relations combined with the integration inertia beyond its political borders. In this respect work with neighbors is one of the most important parts of EUs foreign policy, which from the perspective of EU as an integration product is not solely foreign or external process, due to the fact that there is always an opportunity for further enlargement.

In 2003 the European Neighborhood policy was launched to offer financial assistance to countries within the European Neighborhood, so long as they meet the strict conditions of government reform, economic reform and other issues surrounding positive transformation. The ENP does not cover Turkey as well as other countries in current EU enlargement agenda. Relations with Russia also have a special status and thus Russia is not involved in the ENP as well.

By setting the ENP the European Union has developed a common policy framework for the majority of its southern and eastern neighbors, which initially had only bilateral content. In case of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Partnership and Cooperation Agreements were signed to set the general framework of bilateral cooperation.

The developments within the EU such as enlargement, delegation of more authority from national to supranational levels as well as increase of

EUs influence on global policy along with such threats as migration, terrorism, and conflicts have influenced ENPs further regionalization.

The official launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative that took place in May 2009 has set new agenda of EUs cooperation with its eastern neighbors. 2009 Prague summit declaration entitled “A more ambitious partnership between the European Union and the partner countries” particularly states: “The main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries”². By launching Eastern Partnership the EU has basically framed its relations with Eastern Neighborhood by proposing the 6 EaP countries the Association Agreements, DC FTA in exchange for systemic reforms. Eastern Partnership can be assessed as EU’s attempt to set common rules for its eastern neighbors aimed at making the latter more stable and predictable. By offering economic and financial benefits, such as financial assistance and in a longer term-perspective access to Free Trade Area the EU expected more adequate management and governance that would allow cooperating in spheres of migration flows and security. This approach to some extent is an attempt to use the EU integration model through creation of common economic space in neighboring countries interconnected via EU and thus transformative in terms of reforming the governance system, legislative framework and most importantly in terms of stability and security. The Eastern Partnership - focusing on key priorities and deliverables document adopted by the EC on December 15, 2016 can be considered as a very illustrative proof for this statement. This document sets up 20 deliverables based on the priorities identified during the EaP summit in Riga for the 6 EaP countries to be reached by 2020. All the deliverables are aimed at ensuring stable and sustainable developments in governance, economy, civil society, ensuring energy security, people to people contacts, etc. The document contains a set of guiding principles for

² Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, 7 May 2009, available at (14. 07. 2017)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf

the EaP countries bringing them closer to the European standards and values.

Another aspect of the EaP is a natural consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The former soviet republics that have been disintegrated in 1890s were ready to be involved in new stage of integration. In this respect the Eastern Partnership became an extremely provocative action in terms of “encroachment” on what Russia considers area of its dominance. This resulted in Ukraine crisis, Armenia’s September 3rd U-turn, Russia’s efforts to strengthen its political presence in Moldova, Belarus and Georgia and finally large scale information war between Russia and the West.

Developments within the EaP has put much stricter and clearly formulated borders between Russia and the EU influence zones. It should be mentioned though that the clarification of these borders began before the EaP was launched, the whole process was launched with the Rose Revolution in Georgia followed by August 2008 war. The crisis in Ukraine that was preceded by Euromaidan, Armenian president’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement and decision to enter the Eurasian Economic Union, political fluctuations in Moldova after the signing of the AA, as well as the periodic actions of Belarusian president Lukashenko (provocative actions within the EEU and relative progress in relations with the official Brussels in 2015-2016) illustrate that this process is still going on.

While South Caucasus states and Turkey are well placed in already existing paths of EU’s neighborhood policy, Iran and Russia are more singular in terms of the format of their relations with the EU.

In case of Iran, the long lasting history of sanctions combined with the nuclear program issue and the strategic interest of the EU in Iranian oil and gas are the main factors that define EU relations with Iran.

Negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program between the E3/EU+3 (EU, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and the United States) with Iran resulted in agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015. The deal is aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program while providing for

the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as EU and US sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program³.

This process that was mainly initiated by Obama administration was much supported by the EU despite Israel's active opposing to the process.⁴ However, after Donald Trump was elected certain shift in supporting and leading the process happened and thus EU had to decide whether it is going to become the major supporter of the process or slow down for new favorable situation. On August 5th, 2017 Mogherini attends inauguration of Iranian President, holds bilateral talks which can be a sign that the EU will try to lead the process as much as it is possible. This assumption is made also due to the fact that functionally the EU has certain mandate for taking lead in the process, since the High Representative is the coordinator of the JCPOA.

From the point of view of Armenian-Turkish relations, the improvement of the EU-Iran relations are crucial in terms of rethinking the necessity to stimulate the dialogue between the two sides due to the fact that the opportunities that can appear in case there are sustainably normalized relations between the EU and Iran will have a serious impact on the balance of powers in the region and will create the necessity of strengthening infrastructures and creating alternative communications to ensure sustainability of projects.

EU-Russia relations had two major phases of development. In terms of classical EU-shaped neighborhood policy the first phase of relations was based on gradual development of bilateral cooperation through 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which was followed by Partnership for Modernization that was developed in 2008 and concluded in 2010. Due to its special status, Russia was never a part of ENP and EU-Russia relations were built as a bilateral format.

³ Iran and the EU, available at (14. 07. 2017)

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2281/iran-and-eu_en

⁴ Israel: EU diplomatic office in Iran a 'grave mistake' July 14, 2016, available at (19. 07. 2017) <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-eu-diplomatic-office-in-iran-a-grave-mistake/>

The situation started to change after the August war in Georgia and fall into deep crisis after the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in Donbas.

As a reaction to EU's engaging policy in its eastern neighborhood Russia used two major tools to remain the main power in the territory it considers its traditional interest zone.

The first step was use of force both directly as in Ukraine and indirectly as in Armenia. The three major instruments that Russia uses to make pressure on its former Soviet neighbors are conflicts, migrants, and strong economic presence. Depending on the level of resistance, Russian authorities activate one or another tool to reach its goals. In case of Ukraine, the most radical step was undertaken and resulted in a large scale conflict. Russia needed much less pressure to make Serzh Sargsyan announce the U-turn of Armenia and decision to join Eurasian Economic Union on September 3rd 2013.

In order to formally propose an alternative integration format, Russia has created the Eurasian Economic Union which was preceded by the Customs Union. Through creation of the EEU Russia has basically duplicated the EU-NATO system pairing EEU with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Existences of the two pairs of economic-military systems despite the level of development of any of the organizations are illustrating the current opposing structures in the region. Wider South Caucasus is one of the meeting points of these systems which creates significant threats and challenges which, from a different perspective, can be perceived as opportunities.

EU-Turkey relations

The relations between the EU and Turkey have long and complicated history rich with ups and downs, drastic changes in perceptions of the integration potential.

The first serious milestone in EU-Turkey relations was the signing of Association agreement in 1963 which have created preferential conditions for bilateral trade relations. In 1987, Turkey submits application for full membership and becomes officially a candidate country in 1999.

Meanwhile, to boost the economic cooperation the EU-Turkey Customs Union negotiations started in 1993 and took effect in 1996. The scope of this Customs Union, based on the status of goods in free circulation, is however limited to products other than agricultural products, and coal and steel products, which are subject only to preferential agreements based on their originating status.

In 2001 the European Council adopts the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership, providing a road map for Turkey's EU accession process. The Turkish Government adopts the NPAA, the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis, reflecting the Accession Partnership. At the Copenhagen Summit, the European Council decides to increase significantly EU financial support through what is now called "pre-accession instrument" (IPA). In 2005, Turkey's Accession negotiations open.

After Justice and Development party came to power the relations between the two sides became more fragile and ended up in decision to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey over human rights and rule of law concerns voted by the European Parliament in 2016.

Throughout more than 50 years of relations between the two sides there have been several key factors that were crucial in terms of defining the temperature of relations.

- The internal factor related to the reforms, situation with human rights, freedom of media, as well as Kurdish factor,
- The volume of trade and general economic factor and its influence on the EU internal market,
- The communications and infrastructures factor which is key important for the EU particularly from the point of view of energy security,
- The migration factor not only from the point of view of Turkish migrants in the EU but also, particularly after the Syrian conflict has started the role of Turkey as a buffer for migration flow,
- The relations with neighbors including Middle Eastern aspect and Turkish-Armenian relations.

The balance of these factors defines the quality of bilateral relations and, in case there is a significant change in any of these factors, there is a

serious shift in bilateral relations. During recent years there have been several such cases that illustrate the interconnected influence of these factors. Namely, the role of Turkey as a buffer zone during Syrian crisis has opened space for additional cooperation talks between EU and Turkey. Another example is the post 2016 coup repressions which were the main reason for the EP resolution and suspension of accession negotiations.

In terms of Armenian-Turkish relations (1) the issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide is being articulated by the EU or its member states in two of the above mentioned aspects: the internal aspect, as a call to Turkey to face its history and to recognize the Genocide, as it was done by France during the 2005 round of membership perspectives and (2) as a factor of relations with neighbors, in this particular case Armenia. It should also be mentioned that each case of recognition of the Armenian Genocide by an EU Member State or the 2015 EP resolution on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide⁵ are usually preceded or conceded by worsening of the bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey. Thus, these happenings can be perceived as motions to either “warn” Turkey or to “punish” it. However, apart from realpolitik and in the context of the philosophy of the European integration, the attitude of the EU towards the issue of Turkey’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide has a more conceptual essence. The recognition will be to some extent a proof of commitment of Turkey towards the European values and readiness to face its own past and illustrate its readiness and willingness to normalize its relations with all neighbors⁶. This is also a warranty of regional stability: minimization of potential security threats through normalizing the most hardened conflicts.

In November 2015, the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan⁷ was formalized according to which all illegal migrants that have entered the EU through Greece via crossing the Aegean Sea will be returned to Turkey. By

⁵ European Parliament resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide, available at (18. 07. 2017) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0094+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

⁶ Genocide Recognition Precondition to Turkey’s EU Bid, Says Euro-Parliament President, Available at (21. 07. 2017) <http://asbarez.com/105486/>

⁷ EU-Turkey joint action plan Brussels, 15 October 2015, available at (10. 07. 2017) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm

reaching this agreement the EU has basically gave Turkey the role of a buffer zone for migrant flows. In return, Turkey was promised additional efforts from the EU side for the long-awaited EU accession process, as well as financial incentives to help with the burden of hosting refugee populations within its borders. This deal was strongly criticized by human rights organizations⁸, foreign policy and migration experts⁹. The reasoning behind this criticism was based on two major assumptions. Firstly, the EU cannot regulate and oversee the migration flows outside its borders. Secondly, the agreement will give Erdogan more freedom in terms of domestic policy in the pre-referendum period.

The future developments have illustrated that the criticism was not at all groundless and resulted in a serious crisis in EU-Turkey relations. One day after the EP decision to freeze Turkey's EU accession process, Erdogan has threatened to cancel the refugee deal: "If you go any further, these border gates will be opened. Neither I nor my people will be affected by these empty threats."¹⁰

The Constitutional referendum held in Turkey on 16 April 2017 on whether to approve 18 proposed amendments to the Turkish constitution that were brought forward by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). With 51.41% voting for the proposed amendments Turkey has moved from parliamentary system to executive residency system.

Although overseas election campaigning, even in diplomatic missions, is illegal under Turkish law, the ruling AKP have organized pro-“Yes” campaigns in EU Member States with strong Turkish community. This caused several incidents in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria.

Namely, the Netherlands barred the aircraft of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Çavuşoğlu from landing, and expelled Turkish

⁸ Kondylia Gogou, The EU-Turkey deal: Europe's year of shame, 20 March 2017, available at (14. 07. 2017) <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/>

⁹ Elizabeth Collett, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, available at (19. 07. 2017.) <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal>

¹⁰ Turkey threatens to end refugee deal in row over EU accession, available at (14. 07. 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/25/turkey-threatens-end-refugee-deal-row-eu-accession-erdogan>

Minister of Family and Social Policies, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya from the country, when both tried to speak at rallies. In response, Turkey expelled the Dutch ambassador from the country, and Turkish President Erdoğan called the Dutch "fascists" and "remnants of Nazism" and accused the Netherlands of "massacring" Muslims in Srebrenica during the Bosnian War in 1995. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte called Erdoğan's remarks "unacceptable" and a "vile falsification of history" and demanded an apology.¹¹

This diplomatic incident and reaction of Turkish President were very illustrative in terms of showing the serious crisis in EU-Turkey relations. Erdoğan's call for the Turkish Diaspora in the European Union to "Make not three, but five children. Because you are the future of Europe. That will be the best response to the injustices against you."¹²

In a nutshell, in the current phase of the EU-Turkey relations is quite critical the balance of the factors mentioned above has put the two sides in a situation where no effective dialogue can be made unless there is a drastic improvement in either of the factors or an external factor appears to open an opportunity for stimulating the dialogue.

EU-Armenia relations

As it was already mentioned above, the EU has involved Armenia in its Neighborhood framework and afterwards in Eastern Partnership along with five other post-Soviet countries Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The bilateral relations were regulated by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that entered into force in 1999. This framework agreement was regulating wide spectrum of bilateral relations and identified major fields of cooperation and defining EUs financial assistance for Armenia.

¹¹ Sam Meredith, Steve Sedgwick, Increasingly hysterical comments from Turkey's Erdoğan are unacceptable: Netherlands PM, 14 March 2017, available at (24. 07. 2017) <https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/14/increasingly-hysterical-comments-from-turkeys-erdogan-are-unacceptable-netherlands-pm.html>

¹² Russell Goldmanmarch, 'You Are the Future of Europe,' Erdoğan Tells Turks, 2017, available at (14. 07. 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/17/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-future-of-europe.html?_r=0

After the launch of the Eastern Partnership, Armenia together with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has started negotiations over the Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AA/DC DTA) that was supposed to move the quality of relations with the EU to a new level of integration that is the most comprehensive format for a non-candidate country.

It should be mentioned that the process of negotiations particularly in the period between November 2012-May 2013 were quite impressive. However, on September 3rd Serzh Sargsyan has surprisingly announced that Armenia will not sign the AA and will join Russia's EEU. According to Sargsyan, this decision was made based on Armenia's security interests. Sargsyan has opposed to the "either-or" logic (integration to either one format or another) with "both are possible" proposal, i.e. Armenia will integrate simultaneously to both formats to the extent possible.

The September 3rd U-turn was shocking for both EU officials and the significant part of the Armenian society including many people involved in the establishment and taking part in the AA/DC FTA negotiations. However, the natural demand of the situation was to develop a new format of relations, since the PCA was already outdated and there was a need to replace the AA with a new framework agreement that would regulate bilateral relations.

After around 2 years of reflection, the EU and Armenia have announced about the launch of negotiations over a new agreement, a so-called AA-minus that would contain all provisions of the already negotiated Association Agreement excluding those components that are conflicting with the new obligations of Armenia in light of its membership in the EEU. These components mainly related to the customs and trade relations, since Armenia has granted that authority to the supranational EEU. Negotiations on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement were successfully concluded on 26 February 2017 and are supposed to be signed in November 2017 during the EaP Summit in Brussels¹³.

¹³ EU-Armenia relations, Bruxelles, 27/02/2017, available at (15. 07. 2017) https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4080/EU-Armenia%20relations

In addition to the general framework of relations, the EU has several other integration instruments that involve Armenia. The Mobility Partnership¹⁴, Bologna process, Erasmus Mundus, Visa Facilitation are the processes that concentrate on People to People contacts and mobility related issues which are extremely important for Armenia taking into account the mobile essence of the Armenian society.

Finally, the EU special representative in South Caucasus (EUSR) is another important institution that EU has in the region. EUSRs task is to contribute to a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region, including the crisis in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict¹⁵. These mechanisms along with the EUs position over the NK settlement process in assisting the Minsk OSCE group express the general approach of the EU towards the NK process which can be formulated as: not being directly responsible for facilitation but assisting all processes that can lead to effective settlement.

Armenian-Turkish relations and the EU

Although there have been several attempts to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey ever since Armenia became independent, the major milestone of the Armenian-Turkish relations in the recent period was the signing of Zurich Protocols in 2009 that were supposed to be ratified by both Parliaments but are frozen up till today. This attempt was the most public one and thus had both more significant impacts on public perception of the process and was more influenced by the external factors.

The processes that were launched in parallel with the political talks, particularly, various initiatives aimed at establishing dialogue processes between different segments of Armenian and Turkish societies, were initially aimed at creating grounds for more smooth adaptation in case the diplomatic relations are established and the border is open. Thus, the contacts between businessmen, CSOs, academia representatives, etc. were

¹⁴ Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership between the European Union and Armenia, available at (14. 07. 2017) https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration/specific-tools/docs/mobility_partnership_armenia_en.pdf

¹⁵ EU Special Representatives, 14/06/2016, available at (17. 07. 2017) https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/3606/EU%20Special%20Representatives

mainly targeted on the opportunities that may appear in case of political normalization is in place.

However, after the freezing of the process these initiatives had to reorient and restructure from working on perspective of official normalization to becoming the only working format for dialogue which made the inter-society dialogue a central process in bilateral relations.

It is obvious, that the global and regional actors perceive the issue of Armenian-Turkish relations from the perspective of their interests. In this respect, one of the major external factors, that did not allow the normalization to happen, was Russia's fear to lose the dominance in the region. The opening of the border would create much more communication opportunities and room for independent regional development which would naturally bring to short and long term transformations that are not favorable for Russia. The short term transformations are the economic and political effect that various infrastructural projects can bring to the region and support multilateral integration. The opportunity for regional economic integration will lead to longer term effect which will take place on the level of perception of stability and peace in the societies of the regional countries. This assumption is made, despite the fact that Russia was officially involved in the process of facilitation and the protocol signing ceremony in Zurich was attended by Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov, as well as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and French Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner.

Unlike Russia the EU has been active supporter of the normalization process, since it was completely in line with the logic of EU's foreign and security policy: more stable and predictable neighborhood connected through various integration projects with each other and with the EU. The level and quality of involvement of the EU throughout the process is also in accordance with the transformations of EU foreign policy during the last decade. The process of the normalization that was mainly initiated by the US was supported by the EU. The first wave of the process of promoting the societal dialogue was also initiated by the US, however, after the failure of the protocols, the EU took the initiative of supporting the dialogue

between the CSOs, journalists, businessmen, etc. and continues this support up till today. There have been several multi-million projects to promote the Armenian-Turkish dialogue on the level of civil societies that have been funded by the EU.

At the same time, on the political level the EU is also periodically expressing its readiness to support the relaunch of the interrupted official dialogue. The most recent expression of this was the address of High Commissioner Mogherini during the EU-Armenia Coordination council meeting that took place in Brussels in May 2017: “The EU has also reiterated its commitment to support the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey and our encouragement to both sides to engage in this process without preconditions.”¹⁶ This and other similar expressions signal to both sides that the EU is keeping the possible relaunch of the dialogue on its agenda and is ready to support. Meanwhile, the EU continues to support civil society initiatives and accumulate cases of effective cooperation between the two societies that can be used more constructively in case the official dialogue relaunches.

Conclusion

With the change of the global situation, particularly, Trump election, Ukraine crisis and Brexit, which resulted in certain redistribution of responsibilities among the global actors, the transformed quality of the EU as a global player has created a new logic for foreign policy of the EU. If previously the EU was mainly acting as a supporter to processes initiated by the US or EU Member States, currently it is facing a new reality. The processes that have been launched by Obama administration or even before that and have been backed by the EU in this new reality should have the “second wave responsible” in case the EU decides that it is in its core interests it will take the political lead of the process. This statement is fair for the AA signee countries and may be functional in case of Iran.

¹⁶ Remarks by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the EU-Armenia Cooperation Council, available at (14 . 07 . 2017) Bruxelles, 23/05/2017 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26687/remarks-hrvp-federica-mogherini-press-conference-following-eu-armenia-cooperation-council_en

In case of Armenian-Turkish relations, the situation is more complicated. The relations with Turkey are in deep crisis and Armenia is extremely dependent on Russia in all aspects of its foreign policy. In this respect, although the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is extremely important for the EU, the latter cannot become the new initiator and leader of any official political process at present. In light of this fact the only process the EU can undertake is the utilization of its soft power tools, i.e. support to people-to-people contacts and promoting the dialogue between the societies. As the developments of the previous decade have illustrated, the EU has taken the lead from the US in the societal dialogue process and will work on that level until a new more favorable political situation is created for official reconciliation process to be launched. The accumulation of joint Armenian-Turkish cooperation cases on civil society level will become an important leverage that will be activated in case of relaunch of official talks.

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ԿՈՎԿԱՍՐ¹⁷**

Անվտանգություն

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Ներկայացվող ուսումնասիրությունը փորձ է վերլուծել ԵՄ արտաքին և անվտանգության քաղաքականությունը երկու հիմնական՝ հայ-թուրքական հարաբերությունների և Ընդլայնված Հարավային Կովկասի տարածաշրջանի համատեքստերում՝ քաղաքականության հիմնական

¹⁷ Ընդլայնված Հարավային Կովկասը պայմանական եզր է, որն իր մեջ է ներառում հարավկովկասյան երեք ճանաչված պետությունները, երեք չճանաչված, կամ մասնակի ճանաչված պետությունները, ինչպես նաև Թուրքիան, Իրանը և Ռուսաստանը:

առանձնահատկությունները տարածաշրջանային գործընթացների լույսի ներքո: Վերը նշվածը համակողմանիորեն ուսումնասիրելու նպատակով անհրաժեշտ է անդրադառնալ մի շարք առանցքային հարցերի, որոնք անմիջականորեն ազդում են տարածաշրջանում և հայ-թուրքական հարաբերությունների համատեքստում ԵՄ քաղաքականության վրա:

Նշված հարցերը ներառում են ԵՄ արտաքին քաղաքականության հիմնական տրամաբանությունը և միտումները, մասնավորապես՝ ԵՀԶ, ԱԳ և Եվրոմեդ ձևաչափերի շարունակական վերաիմաստավորման և լրամշակման տեսանկյունից, ինչպես նաև ԵՄ երկկողմ հարաբերությունները տարածաշրջանային պետությունների՝ Հայաստանի, Թուրքիայի, Վրաստանի, Ադրբեջանի, Իրանի և Ռուսաստանի հետ: Բացի այդ տարածաշրջանում առկա հակամարտությունները, սառեցված հարաբերությունները և գերտերությունների շահերի բախումները նույնպես ազդում են ԵՄ տարածաշրջանային քաղաքականության վրա: Հոդվածում հայ-թուրքական հարաբերությունները դիտարկվում են որպես առանցքային գործոն՝ տարածաշրջանի անվտանգության և ինտեգրացիոն գործընթացների տեսանկյունից:

Հետազոտությունը նաև անդրադառնում է տարածաշրջանում և հայ-թուրքական հարաբերություններում ԵՄ դերի և ներգրավվածության հնարավորություններին և դրանց համար անհրաժեշտ պայմաններին: