

REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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China's national security strategy

Chinese military strategy has evolved over the past several decades. From a reliance on Maoist concepts primarily centered on conducting a People’s War to focusing on fighting and winning local, informative wars. National security decision-making was largely characterized by the unparalleled authority of the paramount leader: Deng Xiaoping (the chairman of the Central Advisory Committee of the Communist Party of China), and Mao Zedong (the first President of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China). The vivid evidence of this was the speech by China's 6th President Hu Jintao at the 18th National Congress of the Communist party of China (CPC) in 2012. President Hu Jintao pointed out that China should continue to pursue peaceful development based on Marxism-Leninism and on the theories of Mao Zedong and Dan Xiaoping, for upholding and developing “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”¹

¹“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” meaning socialism adapted to Chinese conditions, is the official ideology of the Communist Party of China (CPC), claimed to be based upon scientific socialism. This ideology supports the creation of a socialist market economy dominated by the public sector since China is, as claimed by the CPC, in the primary stage of socialism.

Dan Xiaoping imported his own theory into the Chinese political system which does not claim to reject Mao Zedong thought² or Marxism–Leninism, but rather seeks to adapt them to the existing socio-economic conditions of China. Deng also stressed that China should be open to the whole world, implement a "one state, two systems" mechanism.³ The theory included the need to economically develop the country, which was put into practice in 1966-1976, when economic reforms were based on the theory of the Chinese President's "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics".

Mao Zedong's concept of the "**People's War**"⁴, remains a dominant theme in Chinese military ideals. For Chinese leaders, "People's War" serves as the underlying principle for, and provides a scientific assessment of, how wars must be fought. For Chinese military planners, the most common type of future combat they will face – local wars on China's periphery – will be fought with the principles of "People's War" in mind. During the Maoist era, China focused on preparing to fight an "early war, a major war, and a nuclear war",-encouraging army builds based on mass, depth, and protracted war preparation. A concept of "local war under modern conditions" emerged during the 1980s to guide "army building" through the major round of military-wide reforms launched in 1985. In its December 2004 Defense White Paper, China replaced "local wars under

² The essential difference between Maoism and other forms of Marxism is that Mao claimed that peasants should be the essential revolutionary class in China, because, contrary to their industrial working "comrades", they were more suited to establishing a successful revolution and socialist society in China.

³ "One country, two systems" is a constitutional principle for the reunification of China during the early 1980s. It suggested that there would be only one China, but distinct Chinese regions such as Hong Kong and Macau could retain their own capitalist economic and political systems, while the rest of China uses the socialist system. Under the principle, each of the two regions could continue to have its own political system, legal, economic and financial affairs, including external relations with foreign countries.

⁴ People's war, is a military-political strategy first developed by the Chinese Communist revolutionary and political leader Mao Zedong. The basic concept behind People's War is to maintain the support of the population and draw the enemy deep into the countryside (stretching their supply lines) where the population will bleed them dry through a mix of Mobile Warfare and guerrilla warfare. It was used by the Communists against Imperial Japanese Army in World War II and the Nationalist Government in the Chinese Civil War.

high tech conditions” with “local wars under the conditions of informatization.”⁵

Whereas Mao Zedong based his thinking on the belief that global war was inevitable, Deng Xiaoping proposed that large scale global war will not occur for a considerable time, and there is hope that world peace will be maintained. Based on this view, Deng submitted the principle that “national defense must be built under the larger perspective of economic construction.”⁶

Over time, analyses of White Papers (China’s national defense papers, which are published by the press of the State Council of the PRC), show that China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and being capable of winning informatized wars by the mid-21st century⁷, besides this China’s main interests are divided into three groups:

- **Security:** Preservation of China’s political system and national security.

- **Sovereignty:** Preservation of territorial integrity. From this point of view, the priority concerns of Beijing are primarily concerned with Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet.

- **Development:** Economic Development, for which a peaceful regional environment is considered as a priority.

The main principle of China’s national security strategy is self-reliance and not joining a military alliance. China maintains military contacts with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;

⁵ China’s National Defense in 2004, available at (10.03.2017) <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html>

⁶ Shou Xiaosong, *New theory of Deng Xiaoping military thought*, Military science publishing house, Beijing, 2007, p. 398

⁷ China’s National Defense in 2006, available at (12.03.2017) <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>

3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit;
5. Peaceful co-existence.

China develops cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party.⁸ Beijing perceives national security as a preservation of unity, continuous development of Chinese armed forces, and a consistent process of implementing their own nuclear program.

During the UN 70th Anniversary in 2015, the current Chinese President Xi Jinping once again confirmed that hegemonism and power politics remain key factors, international security and global economic development is uneven, "The winner must take the whole" approach can no longer exist in the world⁹, and the only legal body which can deal with international security is the United Nations. Furthermore, he added that Beijing is ready to assist UN peacekeeping operations in anytime, in any circumstances.¹⁰ While talking about direct threats to national security, Beijing considers **cyber terrorism** as an important one. Speaking about cyber security, Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that states should equally participate in Internet governance.¹¹ In the UN GA session in 2016 Prime Minister Li Keqiang speaking on international and regional security system insisted that terrorism is a serious threat, mentioning that it is necessary to fight against it by raising the role of the UN, by maintaining the highlighted principles of Dag Hammarskjöld¹² (UN second Secretary-General) and by economic development because development is the solution to all

⁸ Ibid

⁹ China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, First Edition, (January 2017), available at (15.04.2017) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm

¹⁰ Chinese President Xi Jinping - Full Speech at 70th UN General Assembly, available at (09.03.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHNT8jTTh7s>

¹¹ Си Цзиньпин: мир должен совместно бороться с преступлениями в киберпространстве, (09.03.2017) <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2531424>

¹² When Dag Hammarskjöld was appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations on 7 April 1953, there was a full-scale war on the Korean peninsula; the Organization was deeply divided between East and West for resolving all these problems Dag Hammarskjöld created the first armed peacekeeping operation which took place by the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to address the Suez Crisis.

problems.¹³ To this end, the most important step was the adoption of the law on cyber security by the Standing Committee of the National People Congress in October 2016, which entered into force on June 1, 2017. According to this law, the basic network mechanisms and special products must be adapted to national standards.¹⁴

In the early 1990s, former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping advised China's foreign and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to be known as the “**24 charter**” strategy: “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” Elements of this strategy have often been quoted by senior Chinese national security officials and academics, especially in the context of China's diplomacy and military strategy. Certain aspects of this strategy have been debated in recent years – namely the relative emphasis placed upon “never claim leadership” or “make some contributions”. China's increased international profile, especially since 2002, suggests Beijing is leaning toward a more assertive, confident diplomacy. Overall, Deng's strategy remains instructive in that it suggests both a short-term desire to downplay China's capabilities and avoid confrontation, and a long-term strategy to build up China's power to maximize options for the future.

On January 13, 2016 the “**Arab Policy Concept**” was published,¹⁵ which included China's interests in the Middle East surrounding the “Silk road” initiative.¹⁶ Chinese-Arabic mutual cooperation was based on the political will to preserve peace in the Middle East. China is willing to have

¹³ Chinese Premier Li Keqiang addresses UN General Assembly, available at (09.03.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6ZNTJhEkvY>

¹⁴ Cybersecurity law, available at (10.08.2017) <http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecuritydraft/?lang=en>

¹⁵ China's Arab Policy Paper, available at (26.06.2017) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-01/13/c_135006619.htm

¹⁶ On September 7, 2013 President Xi Jinping made a speech titled “Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future” at Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev University. For the first time the PRC President spoke about “Silk Road”. On land - the plan is to build a new Eurasian land bridge and develop the economic corridors of: China-Mongolia-Russia; China-Central Asia-West Asia; China-Indochina peninsula; China-Pakistan; and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar ... On the seas - the initiative will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the belt and road.

pragmatic cooperation in the principle of mutual benefit and win-win results with Arab states. In particular, the process of jointly pursuing the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative, China is willing to coordinate development strategies with Arab states, support each other's advantages and implement potentials in order to enhance cooperation in infrastructure construction. China is willing to cooperate with Arab states to promote the new type of cooperation mechanism featuring openness and reciprocity, mutual benefit and win-win results.

The "**Good, Secure, Rich Neighborhood**" policy was first introduced by Wen Jiabao, the 6th premier of the PRC during the "ASEAN Trade and Investment" conference, which took place in Bali on October 7, 2003. Wen Jiabao pointed out: "The peripheral diplomacy under the new situation is: persist in being good to neighbors, make neighbors our partners, strengthen friendship with them, intensify regional cooperation and bring exchange and cooperation with neighborhood countries to a new level. "Good neighborhood", "Secure neighborhood", and "Wealthy neighborhood" is an important part of the strategy for China's own development. "Good neighborhood" means to carry over and forward the philosophy of "benevolence and good-neighborliness and harmony" of the Chinese nation and, under the principle of peaceful co-existence, make concerted efforts to promote regional stability and harmonious state relations. "Secure neighborhood" means to actively safeguard peace and stability of the region and enhance mutual trust through dialogue and settle disputes through peaceful negotiation so as to create a peaceful and secure regional environment in Asia. "Wealthy neighborhood" means to mutually strengthen beneficial cooperation, deepen the regional and sub-regional cooperation and promote regional economic integration so as to realize common development."¹⁷ If we say the "good-neighbor" policy regards neighboring countries as common neighbors, the policy of "secure and wealthy neighborhood" is to tie China's own interests to those of its

¹⁷ Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao of the People's Republic of China at the Seventh China-ASEAN summit, Bali, (8 October 2003), available at (06.07.2017) <http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/eng/topics/zgcydyhz/dqc/t27714.htm>

neighbors. That means that China has regarded more neighboring countries as its own partners and friends. On China's path on its "Good neighborhood" policy, president Xi proposed the "**Asian Security Concept**" during the fourth summit on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia, in 2017.¹⁸ According to this, the problems arising in Asia should be resolved and secured by Asians. In this concept, Beijing considers India and Japan as the most important regional players. According to Beijing, the US accelerates the deployment of military equipment in the Asia-Pacific region, which leads to strengthening its military ties with Japan.¹⁹

By summarizing all of these concepts, it can be argued that basic values by which the Chinese society should be guided during its existence, were included in the ideologies of "**Core Socialist Values**",²⁰ which was introduced at the 18th National Congress, and "**Chinese dream**" popularized after 2013. Xi urged the implementation of these values in every aspect of life and for the doctrine to be made a "spiritual pursuit" of the public. The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has outlined a vision of China's revitalization as a great power, referred to as the "Chinese Dream" by President Xi Jinping. The Chinese Dream, which is another name for the long-standing CCP goal of the "rejuvenation of the Chinese people," and includes two major parts. First, it aims to increase the standard of living for all Chinese people. Second, it seeks to realize China's rise as a great power.

In 2017, China still continues to uphold the official ideology (**Socialism with Chinese Characteristics**) of the Communist Party of China, which is in the new era. This was reaffirmed by reelected President Xi Jinping during the 19th Party Congress.²¹ The new era can mean a

¹⁸ Mian Ahmad Naeem Salik, Pakistan and the New Asian Security Concept, Institute of strategic studies, (25 August 2014), available at (06.04.2017) <http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/policy-paper-new-asian-security-11.pdf>

¹⁹ China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, White paper, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, January 2017, available at (25.5.2017) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm

²⁰ Full text of Hu Jintao's report at 18th Party Congress, available at (16.05.2017) http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm

²¹ Full video: Opening session of 19th CPC National Congress, available at (18.10.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3pc3SqK5jI>

transition from the era of world's big power into the era of world's superpower; the progressive transition from the era of "Priority Prosperity" to the era of "Common Prosperity"; the realization of the Chinese Dream of great rejuvenation and making greater contributions to the mankind.

From the very first year of Xi's leadership, the issues of foreign security became more critical and extremely significant, stressing that the internal and external security of the state is indissolubly interrelated. At the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC in November 2013, a decision was made to establish the **National Security Council** (NSC) in order to improve China's national security strategy and system.²² The principal aims of the NSC include conducting research that focuses on China's major strategic issues in national security such as territory, territorial waters, diplomacy, military, natural resources, economy and people's livelihood; formulating relevant major strategies; supervising and coordinating the implementation of national security strategies; and carrying out efficient and effective crisis management for both domestic and international emergencies.

China's Nuclear Doctrine

Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Islamic Republic of Iran

In 2006, the Chinese government published China's **nuclear strategy** for the first time. The White paper titled "China's National Defense in 2006". According to the White Paper, China is:

Pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China's nuclear strategy is subject to the state's nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. Beijing remains firmly committed to the policy of **no first use** of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons

²² 9th Berlin conference on Asian security, International dimensions of national (in)security concepts, challenges and ways forward, discussion paper, Renmin university, Beijing, available at (23.04.2017) https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/projects/BCAS2015_Canrong_Jin_Web.pdf

against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building an effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Beijing exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.²³

In another White Paper published two years later "China's Military Strategy," revealed that the Chinese government made it very clear that "China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature." The document went further, stating that the nuclear force is a strategic cornerstone for safeguarding national sovereignty and security. "China has always kept its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for maintaining its national security. China will optimize its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China."²⁴

On July 14, 2005 major-general Tsu Chenngun, Dean of the International Youth Program of the Chinese National Defense University, mentioned that if the US directs its missiles to China, Beijing will respond with a nuclear weapon. Contrary to this was emphasized in Hu Jintao's speech on September 24, 2009 in the UN GA session, where he noted that the danger of starting or implementing a nuclear war must be eliminated once and for all and the PRC will refrain from using nuclear weapons.²⁵ All

²³ China's National Defense in 2006, available at (27.03.2017)
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm>

²⁴ China's Military Strategy 2015, available at (14.03.2017)
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001_4.htm

²⁵ H. Jintao, UN: Nuclear weapons, Maxims News Network, (27 September 2009), available at (16.03.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=panhtpUGnuM>

in all, it is possible to conclude that China will do everything to avoid the use of nuclear weapon, but if it will be necessary, Beijing will strike.

During his visit to Canberra in April 2006, Wen Jiabao said that China takes a responsible role in world affairs;²⁶ China is pursuing a national defense policy within the framework of which the main goal is to control the arms race in the world and promote disarmament. China's authorities are inclined to believe that one of the key challenges to the stability of North-East Asia is the development of nuclear weapons and establishment of ballistic missile technologies by North Korea. The shelling of South Korea's Yŏnphŏng Island in November 2010, showed that the situation in the Korean Peninsula had a direct impact on the formation of security and stability in Asia.

China's position on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is consistent and clear-cut. China is committed to the denuclearization of the peninsula, its peace and stability, and settlement of the issue through dialogue and consultation. In 2016, Chinese Consul General Hong Lei during his speech at the Humphrey School of Public Affairs stated that they are opposed to the development of nuclear weapons in the DPRK and the Korean Peninsula cannot have nuclear, be it the DPRK, or the ROK and its own manufacturing or deployment by others.²⁷ It does not meet the interests of all parties and is not conducive to the DPRK to maintain its own security if nuclear weapons exist on the Peninsula. Therefore, the peninsula must achieve denuclearization, on which China is unswerving. Beijing will encourage other parties to adopt new UN resolutions and take further effective measures to effectively block the DPRK's nuclear development program.

In November 2017, when US President Donald Trump visited China, the two Presidents discussed the issue of demilitarization in the Korean

²⁶ Премьер Госсовета КНР Вэнь Цзябао в Канберре выступил с важной речью, Министерство иностранных дел Китайской Народной Республики, available at (03.04.2017) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/wjdt/zyjh/t244162.shtml>

²⁷ Let History be Guidance to Future: Jointly Building A New Type of Major Country Relationship between China and US is the Historical Trend, Speech at Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota by Consul General Hong Lei, (8 October 2016), available at (12.06.2017) http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1404093.shtml

peninsula and stressed that the two sides will continue to fully and strictly implement UN Security Council resolutions and stay committed to solving the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation. Trump stated that China can fix this problem quickly and easily, urging Beijing to cut financial links with North Korea and also calling on Russia to help.²⁸ However, on April 28, 2017, during the UN Security Council China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi had already responded to Trump's remarks insisted that the PRC is not directly involved in the Korean Peninsula, and the key to resolving the problem is not in the hands of Beijing. Beijing is interested in regional security, which is why it is against the US's deployment of the THAAD missile defense system in Korea, reasoning that it is against him and breaks the security situation in the region.²⁹

In addressing Iran's nuclear program, Beijing has always pointed out that the situation in the Middle East is unstable and as a result, the solution to the problem is not seen yet. In order to reach a final solution to the problem, parties only need to implement peaceful and diplomatic measures. This political line continued until 2008, and in the National defense paper in 2012, references to Iran were lacking. When discussing the Iranian nuclear issue, Minister of Foreign Affairs of PRC Wang Yi said that China always supports and safeguards the comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, and will continue to push all parties to faithfully fulfill the agreement.³⁰ In October, 2017 Wang Guo, Director-General of the Arms Control Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China declared that China has firmly supported the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and participated in its comprehensive and in-depth implementation. He stated that China will continue to take an objective, fair and responsible approach in working with other parties to uphold and

²⁸ Trump says China can fix North Korea threat 'quickly and easily' and does not blame Beijing for trade deficit, Independent, available at (09.11.2017)

<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-north-korea-china-threat-no-blame-trade-beijing-xi-jinping-a8045066.html>

²⁹ China Statement on North Korea at UN Security Council, (28 April 2017), available at (18.05.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzPDI2IVnxA>

³⁰ Wang Yi: China Views Its Relations with Iran from a Strategic Height, (25 May 2017), available at (16.07.2017) http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1465855.shtml

implement JCPOA.³¹ China has always firmly opposed war, as conflict between the West and Iran could have a tremendous impact on China's energy security. China's anti-war stance abets Iran's friendly attitude towards China, and strengthens Iran's energy cooperation with China. China's role in the negotiation process with Iran has been overshadowed by the Western powers and Russia. While China's part has been vague, this actually means that China profits most from the final result. This is enough to safeguard China's energy interests in Iran. In this regard, contributing to resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis seems like a good opportunity for China to raise its profile and increase its soft power in the region.

Make some contributions: Middle East, Caucasus and Africa

China's interest in the **Middle East** began to emerge from the 1990's due to the expansion of China's geostrategic influence outside the Asia-Pacific region. China's security interests in the Middle East are continuously expanding from an energy and economic point of view. President Xi Jinping's visit to the Middle East was the first by a Chinese leader in seven years, and witnessed the signing of billions of dollars' worth of agreements with Saudi Arabia and Egypt³², and a ten-fold expansion of trade with Iran over the next ten years. The significance may extend beyond commerce as Chinese interests align more with Iranian interests than those of Saudi Arabia. China and Saudi Arabia (and Egypt) signed US\$55 billion worth of cooperation agreements during Xi's visit³³, including a nuclear cooperation pact. Strategic cooperation between the two countries is fundamentally based on protecting China's energy interests in Saudi Arabia. If Saudi Arabia is safe and stable, so is China's largest supplier of oil. With instability and uncertainty, China's economic prospects deteriorate. Due to Saudi Arabia's relations with the United

³¹ International Support for the Iran Nuclear Deal, Arms control Association, available at (05.11.2017) <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2017-10-25/international-support-iran-nuclear-deal>

³² Chinese president signs deals worth billions on Mideast tour, Channel NewsAsia, (21 January 2016), available at (19.08.2017) <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/chinese-president-signs-deals-worth-billions-on-mideast-tour-8200546>

³³ Xi Jinping signing billion-dollar deals on Middle East tour, Taipei times, (23 January 2016), available at (13.07.2017)

<http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/01/23/2003637847>

States, China-Saudi military relations have been very limited. From Riyadh's perspective, China does not have the same capability to project power globally, as the United States does, and therefore cannot provide the same security assurances against the international threats Saudi Arabia faces, particularly against Iran or the internal dangers of terrorism.

From Riyadh, Xi went to Iran, becoming the first foreign leader to do so following the lifting of international sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran is not a neighboring country with China, that's why Iran can be seen as "China's great neighbor", with whom China plays in the priorities of "Great neighbor diplomacy". Xi Jinping and Hassan Rouhani (the seventh and current President of the Islamic Republic of Iran) together witnessed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Jointly Advancing Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road as well as multiple bilateral cooperation documents covering energy, production capacity, finance, investment, communications, culture, justice, science, technology, news, customs, climate change and human resources. Iran and China have become natural allies due to practical necessities, not due to ideological compatibility. This is because Iran is a stable country in a region of political instability and has a great deal of resources that China needs.

Chinese officials worry that alleged Saudi funding of Islamic schools in Xinjiang may be encouraging Uyghur militants who have staged several attacks in a low intensity campaign for equal rights and autonomy, if not independence. In addition to this, anxiety is linked to the fact that the Uyghurs have joined the Islamic State, can return one day and become the basis for Western China's splitting, breaking Beijing's "One Belt, One Road" initiative. It is also worth mentioning that there is a great Kazakh diaspora in the Xinjiang Uyghur province, which plays a crucial role in the formation of East Turkestan. From this, it can be concluded that any destructive process that occurs in Kazakhstan may leave its immediate influence on the processes taking place in the autonomous region.

Turkey has expressed its support to China on this issue. During a visit to China in 2010, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that Turkey values its ties with China and would uphold the “One-China policy” and crack down on any activities in Turkey that aim to sabotage China's sovereignty and threaten its territorial integrity. Turkey will work with China to fight separatist and terrorist activities in Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region.³⁴ Turkish President Abdullah Gul's visited China June 24-29. He was the first Turkish president visiting China after 14 years.³⁵ Beijing trusted the Turkish “One-China policy” so much that it provided a rare opportunity for the President Gul to give a speech on June 28 at Xinjiang University. In his speech, the President said that the Uygur people in Xinjiang form a bridge of friendship between China and Turkey. During his visit, President Gul was made the Honorary Professor of Xinjiang University.³⁶ Beijing said that it was ready to find ways to cooperate with Ankara to enhance security cooperation and combat the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism.³⁷ Recently, in August, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu during the meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, told that would not allow any anti-China activity inside Turkey or territory controlled by Turkey and they take China's security as their own security.”³⁸ This type of policy towards China can be linked with its national economic problems, which is in dire need for China's “One Belt, One Road” initiative for becoming a nation so strategically located in crossroads between Asia and Europe.

³⁴ Turkey supports China in fighting terrorism, News of the Communist party of China, News of the Communist party of China, (4 July 2013), available at (08.09.2017) <http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206974/8310601.html>

³⁵ Turkey-China relations in 2009, World Uyghur congress, (1 January 2010), available at (19.06.2017) <http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?p=1516>

³⁶ Will Xinjiang Debacle Put Turkish-Chinese Relations at Risk? The Finnish institute of international affairs, (22 September 2009), available at (19.06.2017) http://www.fiia.fi/en/news/728/will_xinjiang_debacle_put_turkish-chinese_relations_at_risk/

³⁷ Chinese President Hu Jintao Holds Talks with Turkish President Gul, Consulate general of People's Republic of China in San Francisco, (25 June 2009), available at (15.08.2017) <http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t570489.htm>

³⁸ Turkey promises to eliminate anti-China media reports, available at (15.09.2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-turkey/turkey-promises-to-eliminate-anti-china-media-reports-idUSKBN1AJ1BV>

According to Beijing, counteracting all these factors can lead to tension reduction, promoting the creation of Sunni-Shia economic interests, such as Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, and "Silk Road" which connects Sinjyan and Tehran with Sunni Muslims from Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Virtually, religious contradictions can be overlooked, shadowed in the case of state interest.

On June 5, 2014 at the sixth ministerial conference of the **China-Arab** States Cooperation Forum President Xi Jinping delivered an important speech entitled "Promoting Silk Road Spirit and Deepening China-Arab Cooperation". The Chinese president hoped that the two sides would promote the Silk Road spirit and take the joint construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century as a new opportunity. He mentioned that the two sides should hold a broader vision and down-to-earth attitude to establish a "1+2+3" cooperation pattern, namely, to take energy cooperation as the core, infrastructure construction and trade and investment facilitation as two wings, and three high and new technology fields of nuclear energy, space satellite and new energy as new breakthroughs. In the next 10 years, they will strive to increase the bilateral trade volume from last year's 240 billion USD to 600 billion USD, which is an increase in China's non-financial investment stock to the Arab states from last year's 10 billion USD to over 60 billion USD, and would accelerate negotiations to promote the establishment of the free trade area between China and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.³⁹ In China, Arab states see a partner who will buy their oil without demanding that they accept a foreign ideology. They see a country that is far away and has no imperial agenda in their region, but which is technologically competent and will likely be militarily powerful in time. On January 22, 2016 at the Arab League headquarters, President Xi spoke about China's willingness to continue to unswervingly support Middle East and Arab states in preserving their ethnic and cultural traditions, and

³⁹ Xi Jinping Attends Opening Ceremony of Sixth Ministerial Conference of China-Arab States Cooperation Forum and Delivers Important Speech Stressing to Promote Silk Road Spirit and Deepen China-Arab Cooperation, MFA China, available at (27.07.2017) http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1163554.shtml

oppose all forms of discrimination and prejudice against specific ethnic group and religions.⁴⁰

For centuries, relations between China and the **Caucasus** have been included in the Silk Road project. The fact that China is not so popular in the region can be emphasized by the fact that both the President and the Prime Minister have not arrived in the region on an official visit.

China's interests in the South Caucasus are essentially derived from its wider foreign policy goals: securing access to new sources of raw materials where possible, creating a stable environment around China's extended periphery, and, to an extent, opening up new markets for Chinese companies to expand into. China's interest lies in maintaining regional stability in the South Caucasus, but Beijing does not want to be a mediator in conflict-resolution work. Moreover, Beijing wants to contribute to the reduction of the influence of Islamic extremism and Pan-Turkic aspirations in the region. Objectively, the South Caucasus represents a low-order priority for Beijing. In the longer term, however, two strategic projects have been proposed which, if implemented, would significantly increase the region's importance for Beijing.⁴¹

• **A rail link from western China to Turkey** via Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (with a ferry link across the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan to Baku). This project, still apparently only at the stage of initial discussions, has been floated as one of a number of initiatives designed to revive the concept of a 'Silk Road' transportation network linking China to Europe via the Caspian region. It was reportedly raised by Turkish PM Erdogan during his visit to Beijing in 2012.⁴² From Beijing's standpoint, the potential attraction of such a route lies in its contribution to diversifying China's access to international markets, and reducing its vulnerability to disruption of sea-based exports.

⁴⁰ President Xi's Speech at Arab League Headquarters: Full Text, (22 January 2016), available at (17.03.2017)

<http://english.cntv.cn/2016/01/22/ARTIadCQDyVQjG0ADCKr2tcl160122.shtml>

⁴¹ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, China in the South Caucasus, (5 June 2014), available at (09.03.2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/china-in-the-south-caucasus>

⁴² President Erdoğan Goes to China, Presidency of the Republic of China, (12 May 2017), available at (06.07.2017) <https://www.tcgb.gov.tr/en/news/542/75165/president-erdogan-goes-to-china.html>

• The construction of a **Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP)** capable, in principle, of shipping Azeri gas into Central Asia and onwards to China. Officials in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have publicly discussed the idea of gas being transported eastwards via a future TCGP for this purpose. To date, however, there is no evidence of serious negotiations having been held over such a possibility.

There are key points which make Georgia attractive in China's One Belt, One Road initiative. The first one is Free Trade Agreement with both the European Union and China; second one outlet to the Black Sea and overland links with Turkey (with the help of this China can more efficiently conduct trade with European Union; third one flexible position for the OBOR success (the Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM) group and the Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey trilateral group (AGT), Georgia can serve as a maritime outlet to Europe via its ports in Batumi, Poti, and Anaklia. In a May 2017 interview with China's Xinhua news service, Georgian Finance Minister Dmitri Kumsishvili emphasized the potential of Georgia's involvement in the Silk Road Economic Belt SREB to "promote regional connectivity, enhance human exchanges, and expand trade and investment."⁴³

President Serzh Sargsyan, who has paid a state visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC), held a meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping at China National Convention Center on March 25, 2015. At the end of the negotiations, the Armenian and Chinese Presidents signed the Joint Declaration on Further Development and Enhancement of Friendly and Cooperative Relationship between the Republic of Armenia and the People's Republic of China. Moreover, more than a dozens of documents aimed at the promotion and strengthening of mutual cooperation between the two countries in a number of areas were signed. Serzh Sargsyan once again welcomed the Chinese initiative to restore the Great Silk Road. He noted that Armenia regards its relations with China as one of the most important foreign policy priorities and places great value on the deepening

⁴³ "Interview: Georgia to contribute to Belt and Road Initiative: deputy PM", Xinhua News Agency, (9 May 2017), available at (16.10.2017) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/09/c_136266698.htm

of friendly relations with China – a country representing one of the world's most ancient civilizations and an influential member of the international community.⁴⁴ In that context, the interlocutors touched upon Chinese companies' potential involvement in the construction projects of the North-South Road Corridor, the Armenia-Iran railway and a new nuclear plant.

China tries to remain politically neutral in Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the result of which was the abstention of China during the UN GA session on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict in 2008. Despite this, in August 2013, the Armenian Armed Forces acquired a new missile AR1A system from China. The Chinese complexes supply to Armenia means that China has far-reaching goals for military-political cooperation with Armenia, as these supplies will really help balance the "balance of forces", which already is advantageous to Armenia. In the Armenian case, China is also interested in connecting Armenia to Iran via the Persian Gulf. The construction of that road will give Armenia an immediate entry and exit to the Central Asian market, as well as to Pakistan, India, China and ASEAN countries.

China's patronage for Armenia on the Iran-Armenia railroad will not only boost economic activity, but will also be a good opportunity for Armenia to avoid a deadlock that has been artificially provoked by neighboring states. There are two rival projects that include Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkey and China indirectly. The first one connects Kars (Turkey), Nakhijevan (Azerbaijan) and Kaswin (Iran) to each other and the second one connects Rasht (Iran) to Astara (Azerbaijan). They will be connected to each other via railway, from Baku to Nakhijevan, crossing Armenia's territory. Speaking about railways we cannot ignore Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. The opening ceremony was held on 30 October 2017, at Baku International Sea Trade Port in Alyat, where the President of Turkey underlined that the railway will carry Chinese goods to Europe in

⁴⁴ Государственный визит Президента Сержа Саргсяна в Китайскую народную республику, Президент Республики Армения, официальный сайт, (28 Март 2015), <http://www.president.am/ru/foreign-visits/item/2015/03/25/State-visit-of-President-Serzh-Sargsyan-to-China/>

just 12 to 15 days.⁴⁵ The train already began its first official trip from Kazakhstan to Mersin carrying 600 tons of wheat. Let's look what the initiative looks like if PRC will engage into this project. The trains coming from China will enter into Kazakhstan through the Khorgos Gateway, after that, they will reach to Baku. They will continue their way until reaching to Tbilisi, passing through gauge-changing facilities in the Georgian town of Akhalkalaki and reaching Turkish city Kars. It is expected that this project will eventually connect Beijing to London.

China also has plans to build a railway in the South Caucasus. The railway will start from Corgan, which joins the largest city Almaty in the border of China and Kazakhstan, and reaching the territory of the South Caucasus. Regarding Iran-Afghanistan-Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway, it is already being implemented, and the contract, which tied China to Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, was signed in 2014. The project is expected to start from China's Kashgar to Afghanistan's Herat and finally be connected with the Iranian railroad.⁴⁶

The Chinese Government always attaches great importance to Africa. Relations between China and African countries put forward by late Premier Zhou Enlai during his tour to Africa in 1960's. The new Chinese leadership headed by President Hu Jintao has stated many times that China will further strengthen the solidarity and cooperation with the developing countries including Africa, and will make continued efforts to achieve the goal of common development.⁴⁷

China's rapid economic growth and expanding middle class have fueled an unprecedented need for resources (raw materials and new markets for its products). As a result, China has turned to Africa. From a strategic point of view, Africa can help diversify China's dependence on

⁴⁵ A New Asia-to-Europe Railway Route Is Opening Up, Bloomberg, (29 October 2017), available at (07.11.2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-30/azerbaijan-to-open-railway-planned-as-new-europe-china-corridor>

⁴⁶ A New Railway Linking Iran to China via Three Asian Countries, Real Iran, (18 December 2014), available at (14.04.2017)

<http://realiran.org/new-railway-linking-iran-china-via-three-asian-countries/>

⁴⁷ China's Policy towards Africa, MFA PRC, (1 January 2004), available at (06.08.2017) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceza/eng/zghfz/zfgx/t165330.htm>

Western powers. From Africa's perspective, China offers new markets for trade. Moreover, China and Africa have common interests in solving global economic problems, involving such issues as South-South cooperation.

In 2006, Beijing government released an important white paper, *China's African Policy*⁴⁸, to clarify Africa's strategic importance to China. It was the first of its kind in China's diplomatic history with Africa, which embodied Chinese long-term plan of enhancing all-rounds cooperation with Africa. China wants to help African countries get rid of poverty and consolidation of independence. The transformation of China-African cooperation is expressed in the form of aid. In 2011, China's then-Premier Wen Jiabao stated that "China had selflessly assisted Africa when it was the poorest. We did not exploit one single drop of oil or extract one single ton of minerals out of Africa."⁴⁹ This seems to suggest that Beijing views Africa first and most keenly through the lens of political ties rather than economic benefits.

China's infrastructural investments in Northeast and East Africa - especially those projects noted in Egypt, Djibouti, and Kenya, demonstrate that the region is of significant importance to the actualization of OBOR (One belt, one road). Africa will benefit from Silk Road via acquiring Silk Road Fund to its infrastructure development. Technological transformation from China to Africa and job creation is other advantages to least developed countries like Ethiopia.

On his first visit to Africa in early 2013, speaking in Tanzania, China's President Xi Jinping called for China and Africa together to realize a fast track of "comprehensive development."⁵⁰ New ports in Tanzania, rail lines in Kenya, naval facilities in Djibouti and industrial zones along the Suez Canal in Egypt are all intended to support this massive new trade

⁴⁸China's African Policy, MFA PRC, (20 September 2006), available at (07.08.2017) <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zgdfzcc/t481748.htm>

⁴⁹ Wen Jiabao, China Did Not Exploit One Single Drop of Oil or One Single Ton of Minerals from Africa, (15 September 2011), available at (07.08.2017) http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2011-09/15/content_23419056.htm

⁵⁰ L. A. Johnston, Africa, and China's One Belt, One Road initiative: Why now and what next? ICTSD, (15 September 2016), available at (07.08.2017) <https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/africa-and-china%E2%80%99s-one-belt-one-road-initiative-why-now-and-what>

network that president Xi Jinping hopes will become a key pillar of his foreign policy agenda. For Ethiopia, it is located in the Horn of Africa and is a gateway to Africa. This has qualified Ethiopia to be a pilot country for Chinese projects in Africa, including the Belt and Road Initiative. China and Ethiopia have increased their military cooperation since Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Addis Ababa in May 2014. Ethiopia is also relying heavily on Chinese loans to develop its foundations. For example, the Tekeze River Dam in Tigray region, one of Ethiopia's mega hydroelectric projects and the highest dam on the African Continent, was built by the Chinese. China is also financing new dams being built on the Omo River in southwestern Ethiopia and the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River. The Chinese have built most of the roads in Ethiopia, including the Ethio-Djibouti railway project.

Since 2008, China has supported counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Djibouti, already home to other foreign military bases, is the site of China's first permanent naval installation overseas; Chinese troops set sail for Djibouti in July 2017 to set up the base.⁵¹

Good, secure, wealthy neighborhood: China, Japan, India and Pakistan

China attaches great importance to defense and security consultations with neighboring countries. It has established mechanisms for defense and security consultation and policy dialogue with neighboring countries, including Japan, Mongolia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, India and Pakistan, and has held regular consultations and dialogues at different levels with its neighbors, which focus on Asia-Pacific security, bilateral military relations, and regional flashpoint issues.

China-Japan relationship in particular will remain as a basic determinant of the regional security environment. Territorial disputes between China and Japan, like many other disputes between them, are politically sensitive in both countries. However, their common interest in attaining peace will remain strong for the foreseeable future, which is likely

⁵¹ E. Albert, China in Africa, Council on Foreign relations, (12 July 2017), available at (09.08.2017) <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-africa>

to ensure that territorial disputes will not drag the two countries into a war. In 2004, Beijing was inclined to believe that Japan is stepping up its constitutional overhaul, adjusting its military and security policies and developing the missile defense system for future deployment. Such actions led to the Chinese government's engagement in similar provocative moves in the Senkaku Islands. Beginning in 2008, its ships have encroached on the territorial waters around the Senkaku. The frequency of such incursions gradually rose thereafter, spiking noticeably following the Japanese government's purchase of three of the island in September 2012. The 2012 DWP of PRC identifies Japan as a security concern more straight forwardly than in past papers, accusing Japan of "making trouble over the issue" of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Past DWP's have briefly addressed Japan's reconsideration of its concept of self-defense and its "military" alliance relationship with Washington, but have generally focused on the cooperative aspects of the China-Japan defense relationship.

In June 2016 the Japanese destroyer Setogiri spotted a PLA Navy Jiangkai class frigate entering the contiguous zone around the Senkakus at the same time as a group of Russian navy vessels transited the same waters. The response from the Chinese side was naval intelligence-gathering ships entering Japan's territorial sea near Kuchinerabujima and Yakushima islands for the first time and in the southern waters of the Senkaku islands.

One particularly unnerving episode for Japan began in early August 2016 when a China coast guard vessel escorted 300 Chinese fishing vessels into waters around the Senkakus, and over four days a total of 15 coast guard ships repeatedly intruded into the waters, half of them armed.⁵² China's this type of politics is because of Maritime Silk Road policy. China needs to secure its seas on its own terms which lead to the unmanaged open escalation between Japan and China.

Despite all this, China-Japan defense relations have made headway. The two sides have held the seventh and eighth China-Japan Defense and Security Consultation, made their first exchange of port calls by naval ships, and held the first consultation over the establishment of a maritime

⁵² Japan's growing concern over China's naval might, BBC, (28 May 2017), available at (07.11.2017) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39918647>

liaison mechanism⁵³ between their teams of experts. China sincerely fulfills its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by setting up implementation offices at both central and local levels by submitting timely complete annual declarations via subsequent declarations to newly discovered chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China, and through the submission of the annual national protection program. China has hosted more than 240 on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Jointly with the OPCW, China has hosted several training courses for OPCW inspectors, as well as international courses on protection and assistance.

In May 2008, China and the OPCW jointly held a training course on protection and assistance.⁵⁴ With a view to facilitating Japan's role in fulfilling its obligation to destroy its chemical weapons abandoned in China, China has assisted Japan in carrying out 150 on-site investigation, excavation, recovery and identification missions, and has excavated almost 50,000 items of abandoned chemical weaponry. In October 2010, China began to destroy chemical weaponry abandoned by Japan in Nanjing. China calls on Japan to increase its input to this process and to accelerate the destruction of its chemical weapons abandoned on Chinese territory.

The U.S. alliance with Japan is also a key factor in understanding Beijing's strategic animus toward Tokyo. China's military leaders are keenly aware that the security treaty that binds the U.S.-Japan alliance explicitly allows American forces to use bases in Japan for responding to regional contingencies, including Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Even in the absence of territorial disputes in the East China Sea, the PLA would

⁵³ The maritime liaison mechanism between Chinese and Japanese defense departments is a consensus reached by the defense leaders of both countries aimed to prevent accidents on the sea and in the air due to misjudgment and enhance bilateral defense and security mutual trust. According to the negotiations, China and Japan should apply this mechanism in the economic sea zone, open sea and the East China Sea ADIZ within 200 nautical miles off their respective coast, which doesn't include the contentious territorial waters and air space of the Diaoyu Islands.

⁵⁴ Conference of the States Parties, Report on the implementation of the chemical weapons convention in China, available at (24.07.2017)
https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/RC-2/en/RC-2_NAT.1-EN.pdf

likely focus on challenging the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance as a means of achieving its strategic goals related to Taiwan.

In recent years, China's rapid development has led to its pretentiousness in the Indian Ocean, expanding to South Asia, which contradicts **India's** strategic plans. To this end, China wants military cooperation with **Pakistan** as a counterbalance to NATO and the US in the region.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Pakistan is considered as the largest importer of weapons from China, 47% of the exported Chinese military equipment goes to Pakistan. In addition, China also supplies the relevant equipment to support Pakistan's nuclear program. Beijing's support is comparable to the support provided by the US to Israel. When a US delegate once confronted a Chinese diplomat about Beijing's uncompromising support for Pakistan, the Chinese reportedly responded with a heavily-loaded sarcastic remark: "Pakistan is our Israel".⁵⁵ The People's Liberation Army air forces and Pakistan air forces have held regular drills since March 2011 with the first Shaheen exercise held in Pakistan. The second training exercise took place in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in western China in September 2013, and the third was held in Punjab, Pakistan, in May 2014.⁵⁶ Pakistan offers China to deploy its naval base at its Gwadar port, which is located right off the Persian Gulf on the way to the Indian Ocean. The port is in a very favorable position and can focus its attention on both commercial and naval ships. It is important and timely for Beijing to have control over the trade route through the Indian Ocean, otherwise it will work via India. In 2013, the management of the Gwadar port was transferred to the Chinese government's Overseas Port Holdings, causing great concern to India. On July 5, 2013, China and Pakistan endorsed the creation of the Pakistan-China economic corridor, which will link the Gulf port to the Arabian Sea.

⁵⁵ Op. cit., T. Deen, China: 'Pakistan is our Israel', ALJAZEERA, (28 October 2010), available at (28.07.2017)

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2010/10/20101028135728235512.html>

⁵⁶ F.S. Gady, China and Pakistan air forces launch joint training exercise, The Diplomat, (12 April 2016), available at (26.07.2017) <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-and-pakistan-air-forces-launch-joint-training-exercise/>

On November 8, 2014 Pakistan and China signed 19 agreements, mainly dealing with the China-Pakistan economic corridor where China pledged to provide \$42 billion.⁵⁷ India has been continuing to express its dissatisfaction with the continuous Chinese investments in the Gwadar port and cooperation with the Pakistani armed forces. At the International Institute for Strategic Studies of Singapore, during the Fullerton lecture, Foreign Secretary of India Jaishankar mentioned that the Silk Road is China's one-sided, own initiative and India is not bound to follow it without essential consultations.⁵⁸ One of the reasons for concern is the China-Pakistan corridor that will pass through Pakistan's Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, which India considers as its own territories.

Despite all above-mentioned issues India has one more concern regarding Beijing's policy towards Sri Lanka's Hambantota port. The port, overlooking the Indian Ocean, is expected to play a key role in China's Belt and Road Initiative, which will link ports and roads between China and Europe, that's why after prolonged negotiations and deliberations, China signed a USD 1.1 billion deal (in 2017) with Sri Lanka to lease its Hambantota port. So any change in the status quo in the Indian Ocean is bound to alter the security concern for India. Even more, if the change is connecting with Chinese presence, India cannot afford to look the other way. One of the most contradictory steps on this road was held in 2014, when China docked its submarines at Hambantota, India raised the issue with Sri Lanka.

Core socialist values reflection in Asia-Pacific region and in Taiwan

Beijing is inclined to believe that it plays a key role in the Asia-Pacific region, and its policy has its influence there. Since 2006, China has expressed its concern over Washington's ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing notes that Washington accelerates the deployment of

⁵⁷ Китай-пакистанские отношения,

<http://ru.knowledgr.com/09562869/КитайпакистанскиеОтношения>

⁵⁸ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS Fullerton Lecture - India, the United States and China, India's Foreign Secretary Dr S Jaishankar, available at (24.07.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=et2ihw8jHaY>

military equipment in the Asia-Pacific region, which leads to a strengthening of its military ties with Japan. Such a development led to the fact that in 2008, China ranked the United States on the list of states who continuously and consistently reorganize their military forces and refreshes military equipment. The 2012 Concept focused on Beijing's concerns regarding Washington's rebalancing policy,⁵⁹ as the United States is starting to take more active steps to be involved in the Asia-Pacific region's security. Beijing is trying to counteract Washington's policy, and the first and most important step taken in the contribution to the growth of regional organizations where the US is not a member, such as the SCO. Due to this, Beijing's main goal in the region is military cooperation with Russia. In February 2014, President Xi and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed on the construction of the Silk Road, as it would have direct interconnection with Russian Euro-Asian railways. Committed to pushing forward the building of regional security mechanisms, China initiated with relevant countries the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Six-Party Talks, and Xiangshan Forum, China-ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation, and The Center for Comprehensive Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation in the Lancang-Mekong Sub-Region.⁶⁰

In May 2015, Russia and China declared a partnership between Belt Road Initiative and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and Silk Road projects means reaching a new level of partnership and actually implies a common economic space on the continent.⁶¹ Russia's involvements into OBOR are becoming real because of its involvement in two Silk Road Economic Belt corridors. The first one is China-Mongolia-

⁵⁹ Diversified employment of China's armed forces, Information office of the state council, The People's Republic of China, (April 2013), available at (24.03.2017) http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/special-reports/node_59506.htm

⁶⁰ China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, (January 2017), available at (19.04.2017) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm

⁶¹ Russia, China agree to integrate Eurasian Union, Silk Road, sign deals, RT, (May 2015), available at (03.11.2017) <https://www.rt.com/business/256877-russia-china-deals-cooperation/>

Russia Corridor and the second one is the New Eurasian Land Bridge. This type of cooperation is the result of China's viewpoints towards Russia. China inclined to believe that Russia is playing a pivotal role for fostering stability and supporting counterterrorism activities in Central Asian states.

China also gives great importance to ASEAN. At the 13th Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN, which took place in July 2006, China called for increased mutual trust among states. Issues such as combating terrorism and international crime were discussed during the 5th and 6th ASEAN inter-parliamentary meetings. Cooperation is also developing rapidly on the China-ASEAN, and the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, Korea Republic) platforms. On November 10, 2017 Chinese President Xi Jinping called for closer cooperation between the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He said that both sides should make joint efforts to build an open economy in Asia and the Pacific as well as a framework of regional cooperation featuring equal consultation, common participation and all-win results with a view to a free-trade area of the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese leader also called for inclusive and sustainable development prospering the APEC and ASEAN members align their development strategies with the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.⁶² From the 2010 Concept, it became clear that China is inclined to look for new ways to cooperate with NATO, as well as with the EU as a separate structure. Obviously, China and NATO cooperation is taking place under the Euro-Atlantic security cooperation system.

For Beijing, the SCO is an example of "new regionalism" in that it is defined by "open, functional, interest-based cooperation among contiguous states", which is stipulated by a mutual respect for the member states' sovereignty. Under the label of "new regionalism"—that seeks to protect the regional status quo, promote economic development and combat the perceived common threat of the "three evils" of "extremism, terrorism and separatism".

⁶² President Xi Calls for Cooperation between APEC, ASEAN, available at (11.11.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtaGC0JaJJo>

As for **Taiwan**, the issue is an internal problem and is not separate from China's internal national security interests. The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence," the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "*de jure* Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform", thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. China's 2010 White Paper pointed out that if it will be necessary, Beijing's military preparations would be directed to large-scale operations on the South-East coast, whose main purpose is to oppose Taiwan's independence and to promote China's unity. In fact, this has shown that although Beijing expects peaceful settlement, it has not stopped military preparations against Taiwan. Beijing develops a ballistic missile DF-21D (the first and only ballistic missile), in order to avoid greater confrontation and to counteract possible military action. It greatly increases the chances of China's counteracting maritime operations, as well as preventing American passengers from entering Taiwan. The deployment of DF-21D by Beijing has caused concern in the US military context, emphasizing that it is a serious threat.⁶³

On October 18, 2017 during the 19th CPC the President of PRC spoke about Taiwan. He made a clear note for Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen to accept the 1992 Consensus.⁶⁴ And the final part of his speech Xi

⁶³ E. Talmadge, Pacific power may shift with Chinese missile, Associated Press, The Washington times, (6 August 2010), available at (19.09.2017) <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/6/pacific-power-may-shift-with-chinese-missile/>

⁶⁴ A definition of "One China" came out after negotiators from the two sides met in Hong Kong in 1992 and reached a non-written agreement that "there is only one China with each side of the Strait defining the term as it sees fit". This became known as the "1992 Consensus". It was not very precise for either side.

China's slogan described the end result after negotiations: a single state of China that had two economic systems. China was concerned with the substance of the outcome, not so much the form of the negotiations. It was offering a compromise that went beyond the Hong Kong formula for a "high degree of autonomy".

Taiwan's response was to promote the idea of two political entities which were focused on the preconditions and form of the negotiating process. It was concerned more with positioning itself well so it could achieve a higher level of autonomy. Taiwan has been more

stated “We stand firm in safeguarding the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never allow the historical tragedy of national division to repeat itself. We have the resolve, confidence and ability to defeat separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” in any form. We will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party, at any time or in any form, to separate any part of Chinese territory from China”.⁶⁵ We can come to the point that Xi held the same language which he used in the past speeches. Indirectly Xi stated that if Taiwan joins China, its people will receive great benefits; if Tsai bows to pressure and uses PRC-approved language about the 1992 Consensus, then we can talk again; but if Taiwan tries to declare independence, China will respond with force.

On October 26 Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen made a public speech and sent a direct message to the Chinese authorities. She stated “In 1992, we held talks with the other side in Hong Kong and launched the cross-strait institutionalized consultations, including the remarkable talks between Wang and Gu in the 1990s.” Besides this she added “The Chinese mainland’s ruling party has just completed the Party Congress and entered a new stage. I once again call on leaders of both sides to benefit the long-term welfare of people on both sides and to forever eliminate hostilities and conflict.”⁶⁶ In the end the future of Taiwan remains the single most controversial issue plaguing U.S. and Chinese strategic cooperation. Understanding China’s national security approach to Taiwan remains the most important element of interpreting Chinese grand strategy.

In different time period, China’s national security policy has differed. However, Chinese has always maintained its idealist cause – to establish a harmony and orderly international relation. With the rapid development of national strength, China is playing more important role in international affairs. China is not only state that pays attention to its national security. China’s strategy and policy on national security

concerned with form and process than substance and nearly all the rhetoric has resulted in delay.

⁶⁵ Full video: Opening session of 19th CPC National Congress, available at (18.10.2017) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3pc3SqK5JI>

⁶⁶ 十九大后 蔡英文吁习近平展现政治智慧 强调两不变两不会, available at (07.11.2017) <http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/realtimenews/20171026002213-260407>

influences not only China, but also East Asia and even the world. China is working to set up a mechanism for unified and efficient national defense mobilization, stepping up the mobilization of economy, science and technology, information and transportation, and making improvements in the building of its reserve force. China strives to make innovations in the content and forms of The People's War, exploring new approaches of the people in participating in warfare and support for the front, and developing new strategies and tactics for the People's War in the current conditions of the Information Age. China's national defense policy for the new stage in the new century basically includes the following: upholding national security and unity, ensuring the interests of national development, achieving the all-round, coordinated and sustainable development of China's national defense and armed forces, enhancing the performance of the armed forces with informationization as the major measuring criterion, implementing an active defense military strategy, pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and fostering a security environment conducive to China's peaceful development.

Conclusion

The Chinese leadership chose to heed their ancestral lessons, and launched a restrained military operation with clearly limited aims.

- China's interest in the Middle East in the coming decade will mainly focus on economy and culture. Despite this, China could still strengthen its military presence in Middle East. China has decided to build a logistical base for its navy in Djibouti. If the opportunity arises, China could build similar bases in Middle East in the future — Oman, Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, and Iran are suitable choices, based on geography alone.

- China remains ambivalent about the Caucasian stretch of the Silk Road, interested in the strategic relevance of the region, but recognizes that commercial engagement remains tentative. Yet Russia and China have not openly clashed over this equally important region, and they could easily collaborate on security issues to avoid upsetting each other's interests.

- China is now Africa's largest trade partner and its businesses are finding success in African markets, so the Western competitors will have to

accept this new reality. On the other hand, China needs to strengthen its relationship with a real “developing” continent (Africa). The most important step on this way should be concrete contributions to African peace and security.

- Beijing’s strategy is to integrate Central Asia and Pakistan with western China and China proper so that common economic and political interests trump the terrorist separatist challenge. Beijing will move to acquire undisputed hegemony in Central Asia to secure access to vital natural resources and resolve several domestic concerns. The overall balance of power between China and India currently is in China’s favor, and Beijing intends to keep it that way. China’s primary mechanism in this regard is its support for Pakistan. China’s regional expansion in the Asia-Pacific will continue driving India into a security partnership with the United States and Japan as part of its Act East policy.

- China aims to secure a central role in the East Asian regional economy and production networks in the intermediate future, and it has the resources to do so. If the Chinese leadership remains cautious and avoids being overly ambitious, its regionalism strategy in East Asia will facilitate China’s economic development and its attainment of major power status.

- China shares many common interests with all the countries in the Asia-Pacific, including the US. The most notable is the preservation of the peace and stability crucial to regional development, especially in the face of terrorism and tensions in the Korean Peninsula. Within the Asia-Pacific, China will expand its role through bold new initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank and the New Development Bank. China will seek reunification with Taiwan, which is the unstated end goal of its recent naval buildup and maritime expansion.

**ՏԱՐԱԾԱԾՐՉԱՆԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ
ԴԻՆԱՍԻԿԱ: ՉԻՆԱՍՏԱՆԻ ԺՈՂՈՎՐԴԱԿԱՆ
ՀԱՆՐԱՊԵՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ**

Ամփոփագիր

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***Բանալի բառեր՝** Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետություն, Չինաստանի Կոմունիստական Կուսակցություն, Սպիտակ գիրք, տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն, պաշտպանական ռազմավարություն, զարգացման ռազմավարություն*

Սույն հոդվածում քննարկվում են Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետության ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարության հիմնական ուղղությունները, ինչպես նաև միջազգային անվտանգության մարտահրավերների վերաբերյալ պատկերացումները: Հետազոտությունը փորձում է վեր հանել Պեկինի տնտեսական, քաղաքական շահերի վեկտորները տարբեր տարածաշրջաններում՝ ազգային անվտանգության տեսանկյունից:

Հոդվածում ներկայացվում են Չինաստանի Կոմունիստական Կուսակցության կողմից ընդունված փաստաթղթերի, բարձրաստիճան պաշտոնյաների կողմից արված հայտարարությունների և Սպիտակ գրքերի՝ տարածաշրջանային և միջազգային անվտանգությանը վերաբերվող հատվածների վերլուծությունը: Հոդվածի վերջում առաջ են քաշվում արտաքին քաղաքականության մի քանի հնարավոր ուղղություններ, որոնց Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետությունը կշարունակի հետևել ապագայում: