

**NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS OF GEORGIA  
(2005<sup>1</sup> AND 2011<sup>2</sup>): REGIONAL, SUB-REGIONAL AND GLOBAL  
SETTINGS**

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*“Georgia regained its independence after seven decades of occupation.... The Rose Revolution of November 2003 once again demonstrated that democracy and liberty are part of the Georgian traditional values that are of vital necessity to the people of Georgia. Georgia, as an integral part of the European political, economic and cultural area, whose fundamental national values are rooted in European values and traditions, aspires to achieve full-fledged integration into Europe's political, economic and security systems. Georgia aspires to return to its European tradition and remain an integral part of Europe”. (Georgia, National Security Concept 2005).*

**Abstract**

On December 23, 2011, the Georgian Parliament approved Georgia's National Security Concept (NSC) for a second time, replacing the one adopted in 2005. The document reflects the changes that have taken place in the security environment of Georgia (predominantly events related to Russia), as well as their influence on the threats and challenges to its national security. It provides a solid opportunity to examine the country's official perceptions (and orientation) on security, its internal and external

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<sup>1</sup> National Security Concept of Georgia 2005,  
[http://www.parliament.ge/files/292\\_880\\_927746\\_concept\\_en.pdf](http://www.parliament.ge/files/292_880_927746_concept_en.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> National Security Concept of Georgia  
2011 <https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0ByCs3veKblaXU31FNzNRR0pwWEE>

security environments, and its contours of foreign relations. The key purpose of this paper is to analyze how and in what regional, sub-regional, or global settings is the country's foreign policy elaborated, as well as what are the dynamics for the period between the first and the second documents.

### **Return to European Track and Changes in Security Situation**

The introduction of the 2005 NSC describes the "return to European track," and it highlights that "Georgia is integral part of European political, economic and cultural area." Thus, Europe is viewed as a wider "region" that Georgia is a part of, and Georgia's aspiration to become fully integrated into Europe's political, economic, and security system. Particularly, Georgia's Euro-Atlantic orientation of its foreign policy is directly shown through the following statement of the NSC:

*"The Concept underlines the aspiration of the people of Georgia to achieve full-fledged integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and to contribute to the security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system."*

As clearly seen throughout the rest of the text, Georgia aims to join the Euro-Atlantic security system altogether with its attachment to (location in) the Black Sea Region.

The NSC 2011 Introduction highlights two clear components in describing the "changes in security situation:" one of them is connected to the Russian Federation, which is now a "key threat" to Georgia's security (as it "does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia.") The second aspect is more straightforwardly defined by EU and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, adding that eastward expansions have key importance. In the previous document, NSC 2005, however, the Russian Federation was mentioned through the perspective of possibly normalizing relations, stating Georgia's willingness "to establish (a) partnership based on the principles of good neighborly relations, equality, and mutual respect." However, a prerequisite for improvement of relations was announced, stating that the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit regarding

the withdrawal of its military bases from Georgian territory within the agreed timeframe. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.6)

In NSC 2011, it is specifically mentioned that: *“The military aggression by the Russian Federation in 2008, the occupation of Georgian territories, and the deployment of occupation forces in Georgian territories significantly worsened Georgia’s security environment. The 2008 war demonstrated that the Russian Federation does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia, including Georgia’s choice of democracy and its independent domestic and foreign policy.”*

In NSC 2011, the Russian Federation is portrayed as a military aggressor in the Caucasus: a key region (“as a whole”) that Georgia is part of. For example, the document highlights this as: *“Security environment in the Caucasus is worsened by the military aggression by the Russian Federation together the instability in the North Caucasus and the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh”*.

Within NSC 2005, it is the development of friendly relations with neighboring states that receive special mention, without any specific reference to the Russian Federation in a wider context of stating Georgia’s will to “peaceful solution of all disputes based on norms of international law.”

### **European and Euro-Atlantic Integration**

Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union is expressed as a key foreign policy priority. European and Euro-Atlantic integration is clearly stated among Georgia’s national interests. In NSC 2011, it claims Georgia’s “aspirations to become part of European and Euro-Atlantic structures” as a free implementation of the right to “choose own strategic path for future development and the alliances to join”.

One of the main directions of Georgia’s NSC 2005 and “top priority of the Georgian foreign and security policy” is mentioned in the Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union as a realization of the “firm will of Georgian people.” In regard to NATO and EU integration, Georgia is seen as inseparably connected to the Black Sea

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region. Particularly, Georgia's integration is seen as part of the Black Sea states as a means to reinforce the Black Sea region, which in turn is valued as the "South-Eastern border of Europe. "Once again, one can observe the role of Georgia as being geographic, political and cultural part of Europe. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.2; 5, 4)

The 2005 document mentions two key vectors of this integration: the NATO and EU structures. The document says, "Membership of NATO would not only endow Georgia with an unprecedented degree of military and political security, but would allow it to contribute to strengthening the security of Europe, particularly the Black Sea region". (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.4.1)

EU membership is seen as an important guarantee for Georgia's economic and political development, where Georgia's accession to the EU will strengthen Europe by restoring the Black Sea region as a European trade and stability zone. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.4.2)

NSC 2011 also includes the Integration into NATO and the EU as Georgia's sovereign choice, a priority which will strengthen Georgia's security and ensure its stable development stressing Georgia's enduring time as a part of Europe geographically, politically, and culturally, despite its limited time in the Euro Atlantic community due to historical cataclysms.

Georgia's membership in NATO is seen as twofold security guarantee as it provides domestic stability and security, *and* it in turn strengthens stability in the entire region. NSC 2011 explains the idea of Georgia being not only a "consumer" of security but also as an "investor" in collective security particularly through its participation in international missions. Integration into the European Union is seen as one of the most important directions of the nation's political and economic development and its process is being highlighted at every stage.

One of the main directions in both documents is seen in the Strengthening State Defense/Development of the defense and security system through "carrying out large-scale defense reforms" (2005) and through cooperation and learning from partner countries (2011.) Here, there is a clear and direct connection between strengthening state defense to

Georgia's Euro-Atlantic direction or continued integration into the Euro-Atlantic space.

### **Georgia: an energy corridor and transit potential**

Georgia's transit and energy corridor functions are of "special importance," and its strengthening is seen as a national interest priority for Georgia in both documents. Among the directions, the 2005 Document mentions Georgia's active participation in international energy, transportation, and communications projects, in ensuring alternative energy and strategic resource supplies, and in developing strategically important regional infrastructure. (NSC 2005, paragraph 3.5) NSC 2011 highlights Georgia's readiness to "participate even more active in international energy, transport, and communications projects."

Energy Security Policy for both documents is based on the recognition of Georgia's role as an "energy corridor." In NSC 2005, it is "the key role Georgia has as a part of the East-West and North-South energy corridors (part of the corridor of energy resources from Caspian and Central Asian regions to the rest of the world) (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.9) For the 2011 document, it is "the role in supplying the rest of the world with energy resources from the Caspian Sea and Central Asian regions via alternative routes." Georgia welcomes the implementation of new projects in the framework of the South Energy Corridor, including those projects that will supply oil and natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asian regions through Georgia to Europe. The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are listed as such projects.

In the 2011 document, the need for the diversification of energy resources and supplies is mentioned through ensuring participation in joint projects. Furthermore, it stresses the aim to develop the prospective projects that also include hydropower, clean energy, renewable energy, and electricity (with the goal to become an important regional exporter of electricity.)

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### **“Region(s)”**

Under the ‘Regional Stability’ section, Europe is discussed as the “foremost determinants of Georgia’s security environment” with parallel influences from the processes in the Middle East and Central Asia. It is said: “Particular importance” is attached to developments in the Black Sea basin, the Caucasus, and Russia as regional security system components. (NSC 2005, paragraph 3.2). In the NSC 2011, developments in Europe, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus are mentioned as “direct” determinants for Georgia’s national security, while Middle Eastern and Central Asian developments are written as auxiliary ones. In the 2011 document, Russia is removed from this section.

### **Region, Neighboring States: Russia and Territorial Integrity**

“Infringement of Georgia’s Territorial Integrity” is mentioned as the “major national security threat” in the NSC 2005. Particularly, the document provides the logical chain of how if the infringement of territorial integrity is not addressed in a timely and efficient manner, it may endanger the existence of Georgia as a viable state. (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.1). The infringement is caused by “Aggressive separatist movements, inspired and supported from outside of Georgia,” which then led to armed conflict in the country. As a result, the following occurred: the de facto separation of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia from Georgia, and the loss of control over these territories by the Georgian authorities. It should be noted that the formulation “outside Georgia” is used instead of naming the threats or pointing at a specific country, i.e. at Russia.

‘Spillover of Conflicts from Neighboring States’ is mentioned as one of the threats to National Security in different ways, mostly indirectly. It is possible that such a phenomenon causes destabilization in the country as it may elicit provocations from other state and non-state actors, and may also cause a large-scale influx of refugees into Georgia, thereby creating favorable conditions for transnational criminal activities and contraband (NSC 2005 paragraph 4.2). The role of Russia is identified indirectly through the following statement: “*Lack of control over the state border of*

*Georgia with the Russian Federation along the perimeters of Abkhazia and the former Autonomous District of South Ossetia,”* which in turn has the potential to increase the risks. The conflicts in the neighboring states including Northern Caucasus-related conflicts in Russia may also indirectly pose challenges, as a result of which Georgia may be involved in the conflicts.

As a source of danger, Russia is mentioned once as a “risk factor to the stability of the country in certain circumstances” created by the Russian Federation’s military presence (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.2). The document addresses the issue of withdrawal of the Russian military base, however defining it as “no longer a direct threat to Georgia’s sovereignty, but rather as a “risk to national security” damaging the security environment in Georgia until their final withdrawal. (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.3) Moreover, it is mentioned that the normalization of Georgian-Russian relations is supposed to take place as a prerequisite for any potential withdrawal of military bases. Particularly, the text reads: “*Georgia welcomes the transition of the Russian Federation’s military bases to the “withdrawal regime” and believes that irreversible realization of the Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Russian Federation of May 30, 2005 will facilitate normalization of bilateral relations and strengthening of mutual confidence.*” (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.6)

In light of possible military intervention (s) as a threat, it is the state and non-state actors that are mentioned as potential source of danger. Granting passports by the Russian Federation to the citizens of Georgia “in certain circumstances, could be used as a pretext for intervention in Georgia’s internal affairs.” (NSC 2005, paragraph 4.3)

The discourse is changed in NSC 2011. Particularly, among the twelve threats, risks, and challenges to National security, three of them are directly connected to Russia: (a) Occupation of Georgian territories by the Russian Federation and terrorist acts organized by the Russian Federation from the occupied territories; b) The risk of renewed military aggression from Russia, and c) Violation of the rights of internally displaced persons and refugees from the occupied territories). Part of the conflicts in the Caucasus as threats and challenges are also Russia-tied (“possible spillover

of conflicts from neighboring countries. RF's attempts to demonize Georgia among the population of North Caucasus, continuous conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan with its possible risk of Russia's continuous influence over the entire region, etc.") Russia-tied risks are also described as Cyber-threats, Environmental challenges, and a significant terrorist threat, which is said to be "coming from the territories occupied by the Russian Federation."

NSC 2011 has a number one priority in its National Security Policy, and it is "Ending the occupation of Georgia's territories; relations with the Russian Federation."

In NSC 2011, key concepts include "Peaceful," "non-use of force," and "through international community involvement." The adoption of the term "occupation" in international political and legal documents is also an important component of the de-occupation policy. The documents states: *"In this regard, the documents adopted by the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the US Senate, and legislative bodies of other partner nations of Georgia carry great importance."* The aforementioned entities are seen as "partners" in the de-occupation process, as opposed to the Russian Federation grouping them under the concept "partner nations."

In NSC 2011, two concepts - "Good neighborly relations" and "preparedness to a dialogue" - are used as a possible vision for normalization of relations with the Russian Federation. This vision was referenced in NSC 2005 in a different frame. Prerequisites for the normalization process here is the beginning of de-occupation (2011), whereas for the 2005 document, it was the withdrawal of military bases from Georgia as according to the agreed plan. According to NSC 2011: *"Georgia is willing to have good-neighborly relations with the Russian Federation, based on the principle of equality—which is impossible without respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and the beginning of de-occupation. Georgia is willing to start a dialogue with the Russian Federation on these fundamental issues."*

The integration of Georgia into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions is mentioned as not contradicting the Russian Federation's



interests. They are not viewed as part of a “competition” between two security systems that Russia is part of, but on the contrary, as something that would be beneficial. Particularly, the document states, “...it will foster peace and stability in the Caucasus, ensuring Russian security on its southern borders.”

### **Region: Caucasus and Neighbors**

In the NSC 2011, relations with neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan are framed within the Cooperation in the South Caucasus as one of Georgia’s National Interests. Although the framing of the Caucasus as a region was previously discussed, the South Caucasus as a region is revisited. Also from the document, Georgia’s view of the Caucasus as a whole and belief in the viability of the South Caucasus as a region is noted, as well as the hope in its possible transformation into “an economically attractive, peaceful, and safe region.” In the section devoted to natural protection, there is an attempt to view the Caucasus as a whole region, particularly bringing the people of the North Caucasus into the same agenda. The document states: “*The preservation of the unique nature of the Caucasus and of the region’s environmental security, along with the related issues, should become the subject of joint efforts by Georgia and the peoples of the North Caucasus.*” Furthermore, the document elaborates on the Caucasus as a whole region bringing forth the concept of “the Caucasus - common home for all individuals and groups living here” (NSC 2011). Meanwhile, Georgia’s supporting role for the development of multilateral cooperation is mentioned as a Black Sea littoral state. However, Nagorno-Karabakh as an unresolved conflict zone is a factor undermining the stability of the countries in the region. The 2011 document is consistent in viewing the possibility for joint regional activities that would include Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey simultaneously. Namely, it is stated as part of the environmental security policy. Particularly: “*Successful cooperation between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Georgia will contribute to the protection of the natural environment and the improvement of environmental security.*” (NSC 2011)

In NSC 2005, there is a milder version of the belief in a viability of the South Caucasus as a whole “united region” to take form; the document expresses Georgia’s belief in the importance of elaboration of “joint approaches about the future of the region.” Regional stability is endangered by the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Georgia states its position regarding the conflict by situating it in the frame of “peaceful solution,” and advocates for “more active international involvement.” (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.4)

### **Relations of Georgia with Armenia and Azerbaijan**

Relations of Georgia and Azerbaijan is mentioned as a “strategic partnership,” and appreciated with its regional energy (transportation) project component as not only economically important but also for its potential for stabilizing the region. In NSC 2011, the close cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan on political and security issues is mentioned separately, as well as Euro-Atlantic integration. The GUAM framework cooperation, Azerbaijan’s participation in the EU Eastern Partnership, and the NATO Partnership for Peace program are also mentioned as common formats

Georgian-Armenian relations are seen in the frames of the “traditional friendship between them” and defined as “close cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.” The relationship should focus on “deepening good neighborly relations.” Though the document states Georgia’s aspirations to strengthen trade, economic, and transportation ties with Armenia, it does not name any specific and/or current projects and initiatives. Multilateral formats are not mentioned with regard to Armenia-Georgia joint efforts or participation. EU Eastern Partnership participation and more active cooperation with NATO are mentioned as initiatives that Georgia welcomes. Armenia-Turkish relations are added to the lists that Georgia is supportive of in the 2011 Document.

The 2011 document is different from the 2005 one in its placement of Relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan among the Priorities of National Security Policy (2011), and is not in the Section where strengthening foreign relations are specified (2005).

It is worth noting the vision of the relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan comparatively. Particularly, in the NSC 2005, Armenia and Azerbaijan are mentioned as being on the same level in their titles (“partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan,” “historically established traditional good neighborly relations.”) However, the text further indicates a certain differentiation. In the case of Azerbaijan, it is “strategic partnership,” and for Armenia, it is “close partnership in the areas of mutual interest.” Azerbaijan is valued not only as a good neighboring state, but also for its potential to increase Georgia’s transit opportunities and energy diversification efforts. For Armenia, the benefit is rather seen as one-sided; focusing on Armenia’s benefit (“*Georgia believes that Armenia should benefit from Georgia's transit location by transporting Armenian goods through its territory.*”)

Azerbaijan is also mentioned also in the multilateral cooperation framework such as GUAM, EU ENP, and NATO PfP, contributing to the “harmonization of security interests and elaboration of common positions on various strategic issues.” Multilateral cooperation between Georgia and Armenia is mentioned as “active cooperation in BSEC,” and Armenia’s stronger connection with EU and NATO is welcomed.

### **Strengthening of foreign relations with international community both in bilateral and multilateral formats**

In NSC 2005, the National security goal is seen as its strengthening of foreign relations with the international community both in bilateral and multilateral formats, which includes countries and organizations such as the United States (“strategic partnership”, paragraph 5.5.1,) Ukraine, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russian Federation, Regional Cooperation within the Black Sea Region (GUAM, BSEC), OSCE, UN, CoE, as well as through Inter-regional cooperation (Baltic states, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and Central Asia). (Paragraph 5.5)

Bilateral: United States of America

In NSC 2005, it is stated that Georgia continues to develop its strategic partnership with the United States of America. The support from USA to Georgia is valued in diverse areas including defense capabilities as

well as Georgia's participation in the anti-terrorist coalition led by the U.S. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.1)

NSP 2011 has the same statement about the continuation of the deepening of its strategic partnership with the U.S. Additionally, Georgian appreciation for U.S. support in de-occupation, financial support, deepening economic and trade relations, and strengthening Georgia's defense capabilities through US assistance programs is expressed.

### **Bilateral: Ukraine**

With regard to Ukraine, both documents state the same framework for cooperation and fields of mutual interest. Georgia's relationship with Ukraine is situated under the title "strategic partnership" and introduced in the context of the Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine as "confirmations of the belief in common values of democracy and freedom."

Bilaterally, the partnership in the fields of free trade, industrial cooperation, and military education and assistance is stressed. In foreign and national security policy terms, Georgia cooperates with Ukraine not only bilaterally but also multilaterally in forums such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE,) Council of Europe, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR,) and others. Georgia would welcome Ukraine's possible participation in the Secretary General's Group of Friends. The Euro-Atlantic integration process is seen as an area of Joint interest and cooperation.

### **Bilateral: Turkey – "a leading regional partner", "largest trade and economic partner"**

Both documents discuss the "strategic partnership" with Turkey as an "a leading regional partner of Georgia," a "valuable military partner" (training, education and assistance in modernizing military infrastructure) by mentioning Turkish support to Georgia's efforts to develop stable economic, political, and military institutions.

In NSC 2005, Turkey is also valued for the partnership in trade and economy due to joint regional transportation and strategically important energy projects (i.e. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines). (NSC 2005 paragraph 5.5.3)

However, NSC 2011 has a slightly wider circle of joint interest and spheres for Georgian-Turkish cooperation. It again underlines the trade and economic partnership, stating that Turkey is Georgia's "largest trade and economic partner;" this is evident due to operating free trade and visa-free regimes between Georgia and Turkey. It is strategically important for both countries to continue "deepening economic, energy, and transport relationships, and the successful implementation of other projects" (i.e. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum pipelines, Nabucco, the Eurasian Oil Transport Corridor, White Stream, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway.) It is crucial to note the two countries military partnership. Turkey is "an important military partner", in addition to being a "regional leader" as a valued "NATO member-state."

Cultural heritage monuments are also mentioned as a sphere of cooperation.

### **Silencing Iran:**

It is worth mentioning that Iran is absent from both documents; Iran is not stated as a regional power within bilateral and multilateral dimensions. Particularly, Iran is mentioned once among the countries of economic cooperation. It states: "*Georgia will continue economic cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and other states of the Black Sea region, the Middle East, and Central Asia.*"

### **Multilateral: Black Sea Region and Others**

Multilaterally, Georgia is perceived as a Black Sea country and is an integral part of the Euro-Atlantic and European security.

Georgia's security policy is based on the principle that security in the Euro-Atlantic area is indivisible, and that Georgia, as a Black Sea country, is an integral part of it. Georgia welcomes ongoing integration of the Black Sea countries into NATO and the EU, and firmly believes that Georgia's

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future lies with the more secure and stable Black Sea region and, consequently, with NATO and the EU. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.6)

Strengthening cooperation with the Black Sea states is of utmost importance for Georgia. In this respect, Georgia attributes special importance to the cooperation in the following regional initiatives: GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) with a focus on U.S.-GUAM framework, BSEC (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation) given the appreciating value of its serious economic potential and geopolitical importance, BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group,) and cooperating within the CSBM (Confidence and Security Building Measures) on the Black Sea (also known as the “Ukraine Initiative.”)

In NSC 2005, the inter-regional cooperation activities with Baltic Sea states is seen as important in terms of sharing the “Baltic experience of European and Euro-Atlantic integration,” and the support they get from these states for Georgia’s aspiration to integrate into NATO and the EU. The states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are also valued in terms of the support in Georgia’s European aspirations (“New Friends of Georgia group.”)

In its relations with Central Asian states, the key role of Georgia is to be a “natural link between West and East,” to attain a “close relationship,” and in promoting the free flow and exchange of energy resources, goods and information between the West and East. (NSC 2005, paragraph 5.5.7)

NSC 2011 elaborates on the following inter-regional cooperation formats: Baltic states (sharing the experience of the Baltic States in European and Euro-Atlantic integration as well as the support from these countries to Georgia on its path to NATO and EU integration is important); Central and Southeast European and Scandinavian states; Moldova and Belarus (“great importance, welcoming their EU Eastern Partnership participation”); Cooperation with Central Asia regional states is based on accepting Georgia being “a natural bridge between Europe and Asia.” The main goal of this cooperation with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan is to facilitate the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital between the West and East.

For Georgia, the following multilateral cooperation forums are listed as important for its national security environment: the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Council of Europe (NSC 2005, 2011).

Georgia places great importance on deepening political dialogue and economic relations with China, Japan, South Korea, Israel, the Persian Gulf states, Canada, India, Brazil, Australia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia in order to foster trade and investment, and to generate international support for Georgia.

It is seen as important to continue establishing diplomatic relations with Latin American and Caribbean states in order to provide for Georgia's economic growth, attract investments, and raise awareness of Georgia in these countries. Special attention should be paid to gaining further support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, and to mutually beneficial cooperation within the UN and other international organizations.

### **Conclusion**

In Georgia's Return to European Track, Europe is viewed as a wider "region" that Georgia is a part of, and Georgia's aspiration to become fully integrated in Europe's political, economic and security system.

The introduction of NSC 2011 clearly has two key features in describing the "changes in security situation:" one of them is connected to the Russian Federation, which is now a "key threat" to Georgia's security (as it "does not accept the sovereignty of Georgia,") and the other feature is more straightforwardly defined by adding the Eastward expansions as key importance in Euro-Atlantic and EU integration. Thus, inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union is recognized as a "Key Priority" as stated in both documents. With regard to NATO and EU integration, Georgia is seen as inseparable to the Black Sea region. Georgia's membership in NATO is seen as a twofold security guarantee; it's both Georgia's guarantee for stability and security, and for strengthening stability in the entire region.

Georgia puts its transit and energy corridor functions under the frame described as "especially important", and strengthening of which is seen as a

national interest priority in both documents. Georgia welcomes the implementation of new projects in the framework of the South Energy Corridor, including those projects that will supply oil and natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asian regions through Georgia to Europe.

Europe is the wider “region” that Georgia puts itself in; it is the “foremost determinants of Georgia’s security environment” with parallel influences from the processes in the Middle East and Central Asia. “Particular importance” is attached to developments in the Black Sea basin, and the Caucasus as inclusive of regional security system components. In the 2005 document, Russia, though not in a supporting list, is part of the security system, while in 2011; it is removed from the listing.

“Infringement of Georgia’s Territorial Integrity” is mentioned as a “major national security threat” in NSC 2005. Spillover of Conflicts from Neighboring States is mentioned as one of the threats to National Security in different ways, mostly indirectly. The discourse changes in NSC 2011. Particularly, among the twelve threats, risks, and challenges to National security, three of them are directly connected to Russia. “Good neighborly relations” and “preparedness to have a dialogue” are the concepts used in NSC 2011 in relation towards the Russian Federation as a possible vision for the normalization of relations. This vision could be noted in the previous NSC 2005, but in a different frame. The beginning of de-occupation (2011) is a prerequisite for normalization, whereas in the 2005 document, it was withdrawal of military bases from Georgia as according to the agreed plan.

In NSP 2011, relations with neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan are framed within the Cooperation in the South Caucasus as one of the National Interests. In both documents, the Caucasus *and* the South Caucasus are viewed as a region. Moreover, based on the document, Georgia’s view of the Caucasus as a whole and its belief in the viability of the South Caucasus as a region can be noted. It also includes the hope in its possible transformation into “an economically attractive, peaceful, and safe region.” Armenia and Azerbaijan are mentioned as being on the same level in their titles (“partnership with Armenia and Azerbaijan,” and “historically established traditional good neighborly relations.”) However, the text later



reveals a noticeable differentiation. In the case of Azerbaijan, it is a “strategic partnership,” whereas for Armenia, it is a “close partnership in the areas of mutual interest.”

It is a goal for the national security to strengthen foreign relations with the international community bilaterally and multilaterally, which includes countries and organizations such as the U.S., (“strategic partnership,” paragraph 5.5.1), Ukraine, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russian Federation, Regional Cooperation within the Black Sea Region (GUAM, BSEC), OSCE, UN, CoE, as well as through Inter-regional cooperation (Baltic states, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.)

Bilaterally, Turkey is a leading regional partner and is Georgia’s “largest trade and economic partner;” a slightly wider circle of joint interest and spheres for cooperation is evident in NSC 2011 in comparison to the 2005 document.

It is worth mentioning that Iran is absent from both documents; there is no mention regarding the country as a regional power or within bilateral and multilateral dimensions.

Multilaterally, Georgia is a Black Sea country that is vital in the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Europe strengthening cooperation with the Black Sea states is of utmost importance for Georgia.

**ՎՐԱՍՏԱՆԻ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ 2005Թ. ԵՎ 2011Թ.  
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տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն, Հարավային Կովկաս*

2011 թ. դեկտեմբերի 23-ին Վրաստանի Ազգային ժողովը հավանության արժանացրեց Վրաստանի Ազգային անվտանգության երկրորդ հայեցակարգը՝ փոխարինելով նախորդ 2005 թ. ընդունված

հայեցակարգը: Ընդունված փաստաթղթում արտացոլված են անվտանգության միջավայրում տեղի ունեցած փոփոխությունները (մասնավորապես Ռուսաստանին առնչվող միջադեպերը), ինչպես նաև ազգային անվտանգության վտանգների և մարտահրավերների վրա վերջիններիս ունեցած ազդեցությունները: Փաստաթղթերի փոփոխությունների ուսումնասիրությունը լայն հնարավորություն է ընձեռում քննելու երկրի պաշտոնական մոտեցումները (և կողմնորոշումները) անվտանգության, ներքին և արտաքին անվտանգային միջավայրերի և արտաքին հարաբերությունների ուրվագիծը: Այս հոդվածի հիմնական նպատակն է վերլուծել, թե երկրի արտաքին քաղաքականության հիմքում ինչպիսի ենթատարածաշրջանային, տարածաշրջանային և գլոբալ կարգավորումներ են ընկած՝ դիտարկելով այն Ազգային անվտանգության երկու հայեցակարգերում նկատված փոփոխությունների տեսանկյունից: